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JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICES AND BELIEFS
Jared A. Goldstein*
In the familiar 1947 movie “Miracle on 34th Street,” faith and 
law come into comical conflict. As anyone who has seen the movie 
remembers, the plot concerns the identity of a jolly, portly, white-
bearded old man who calls himself Kris Kringle and claims to be 
the one and only Santa Claus. When the old man’s apparent 
delusion lands him in a state mental institution, the film’s romantic 
lead, a lawyer, sets out to free him. An involuntary commitment 
hearing is called to determine the purported Santa’s sanity, and the 
old man’s lawyer sets out to prove that his client is the true Santa. 
The district attorney argues that the existence of Santa Claus is not 
a proper subject for judicial inquiry. The judge considers this but 
rules that the existence of Santa Claus is a factual issue to be 
resolved through evidence. The question of proof is somewhat 
difficult: how can the existence of Santa Claus be established using 
the tools of law, when, as our lawyer-hero explains, belief in Santa 
Claus is based on faith, and faith “means believing in things when 
common sense tells you not to”? 
Fortunately for movie watchers, the writers of “Miracle on 
34th Street” were unfamiliar with the principle that courts are 
prohibited from resolving religious questions.  Three years before 
the release of the movie, the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
United States v. Ballard, which declares that the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment cordon off a “forbidden domain” that 
judges and juries may not enter: they may not attempt to determine 
the “truth or falsity” of religious claims.1  Since Ballard, the Court 
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Jonathan Cedarbaum, Douglas Laycock, Gregory Magarian, Susan Schmeiser, 
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1 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
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has greatly expanded its articulation of this prohibition, stating that 
not only are courts prohibited from attempting to determine the 
truth of religious beliefs, they may not seek to resolve 
“controversies over religious doctrine and practice,”2 may not 
undertake “interpretation of particular church doctrines and the 
importance of those doctrines to the religion,”3 may make “no 
inquiry into religious doctrine,”4 and may give “no consideration 
of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or 
the tenets of faith.”5  Courts are thus said to be barred from 
resolving all questions about religious practices and doctrine.  If 
the existence of Santa Claus is a religious question, courts may not 
answer it.
In Employment Division v. Smith,6 the Supreme Court 
indicated that the prohibition against judicial resolution of religious 
questions should be understood to apply broadly and absolutely.  
Since that decision in 1990, lower courts have relied on the 
prohibition to dismiss a wide range of otherwise ordinary disputes, 
whenever their resolution would require examination of religious 
matters. Courts deem contracts unenforceable when they contain 
religious terms that might require judicial construction.7  In child 
custody and divorce cases, courts refuse to determine whether a 
custodial parent abided by prenuptial or divorce agreements 
mandating that children be raised in a particular religion because it 
would require courts to examine religious questions.8 Courts have 
refused to adjudicate negligence claims against churches, religious 
therapists, and faith healers because of the difficulties of 
determining the reasonableness of a religious actor’s conduct 
without examining religious standards.9 Courts have held 
unenforceable consumer fraud statutes prohibiting the false 
2 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
3 Id. at 450.
4 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1978).
5 Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., 396 U.S 367, 368.
6 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7 See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
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labeling of food to be kosher under Orthodox Jewish dietary 
standards because, among other reasons, such statutes call on 
courts to examine religious doctrines and practices to determine 
whether the food actually complies with Jewish law.10
Employment discrimination claims against religious organizations 
are frequently dismissed because they might call upon courts to 
evaluate whether religious doctrines played any role in the 
employment decisions at issue.11  A broad prohibition on judicial 
examination of religious questions thus has had the effect of 
immunizing from judicial review a wide range of conduct simply 
because examining the conduct could entail examining religious 
beliefs or practices.  
As several commentators have noted, the prohibition on 
judicial inquiry into religious questions has much in common with 
the political question doctrine.12  Just as the Constitution gives the 
political branches, and not the courts, the authority to resolve 
political questions, so the Constitution can be understood to leave 
questions about religion to religious bodies. It is appealing to 
believe that, just as Marbury v. Madison declares that there are 
questions “in their nature political” and therefore unsuitable to 
10 See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L Rev. 99, 132 (“The Court 
has developed a religion clause analogue to the political question doctrine” that 
applies when the resolution of litigation “depends upon interpretation of 
religious doctrine”); Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty of 
Religious Lawfinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 211, 226-228 
(1991) (“Perhaps the model of a ‘religious question doctrine,’ analogous to one 
version of the political question doctrine, will help to illuminate the civil courts’ 
habit of refraining from inquiry into matters of religious law”); Scott C. 
Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219, 220 (2000) (“Broadly conceptualized, this 
restriction amounts to a general prohibition on the adjudication of religious 
questions, not unlike the Article III prohibition on the adjudication of so-called 
political or nonjusticiable questions.”); Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and 
Protection: “Religion” in the Law, 73 Yale L.J. 599 (1964) (stating that the 
Court has held that the “first amendment compels religious reservation—any 
examination of a religion’s ‘truth’ for whatever purpose is forbidden by the 
Constitution.”) (emphasis in original). 
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judicial resolution, so there are questions that by their nature are 
religious and likewise off-limits to the courts.13  Courts have no 
business deciding whether to declare war or impose taxes; nor 
should courts have any role in deciding what prayers should be 
said in church or who should be elected Pope.  
Like the political question doctrine, the prohibition on judicial 
inquiry into religious questions is understood to be a justiciability 
doctrine—once it becomes apparent that the resolution of a case 
would require a court to undertake examination of religious 
matters, the court has no choice but to dismiss the case.14  The 
prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions is also 
said to rest on two considerations analogous to prominent 
considerations in the political question doctrine.  First, courts are 
said to be incompetent to resolve religious questions,15 just as 
courts are said to be incompetent to resolve political questions.16
Second, the prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions 
reflects a concern about separation of powers—in this case, 
between church and state—just as the political question doctrine 
reflects concerns over the separation of powers between the 
judicial and the political branches.17
13 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
14 See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1236 
(describing religious questions as “non-justiciable”); Gedicks, supra note 13 at 
132 (stating that when cases call upon courts to interpret religious doctrine they 
“generally must abstain from adjudicating the case rather than rendering the 
interpretation itself, because theological and ecclesiastical questions are not 
justiciable”); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 42-49 (1998). 
15 James Madison declared the proposition that a “Civil Magistrate is a 
competent Judge of Religious truth” to be “an arrogant pretension falsified by 
the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world.”  
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 301 (Robert A. Rultand et al. eds., 1973); see also 
supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text. 
16 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
17 As Professor Tribe has stated, “The doctrines that prohibit excessive 
church-state entanglement reflect the Madisonian concern that secular and 
religious authorities must not interfere with each other’s respective spheres of 
choice and influence.”  Tribe, supra note 14 at 1226; see also Esbeck, supra
note 14.  Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 (courts lack competence to 
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The post-Smith adoption of a broad prohibition on judicial 
inquiry into religious questions has received little attention, either 
in the courts or in academic literature.  To be sure, many articles 
have examined how the prohibition should be applied in various 
contexts.  Some commentators have thus argued that kosher food 
laws are consistent with constitutional limitations on the courts’ 
authority, while others have taken a contrary view.18
Commentators have likewise taken differing positions on how the 
prohibition should be applied in adjudicating employment 
discrimination claims against religious entities, negligence claims 
against religious actors, contract claims involving religious terms, 
and child custody cases, among other subjects.19  Considerable 
attention has been given to how statutes addressing religion can be 
construed consistently with the prohibition.20  But with the 
adoption of an apparently absolute judicial prohibition on the 
resolution of all religious questions, the time has come to ask a 
much more basic question, much as Louis Henkin asked with 
regard to the political question doctrine in 1976: Is there a religious 
question doctrine?21
As a purely descriptive matter, it is clear that the courts 
believe that such a doctrine exists and routinely dismiss cases for 
resolve political questions because of a “lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards”).
18 See supra note 104.
19 See supra notes 96, 97, 101, 107, and 111. At least two articles have 
addressed the prohibition in greater depth.  See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law 
and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with 
Religious Significance, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 781 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, 
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious 
Practice and Belief, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 85 (1997).  Neither of those articles, 
however, advances a generally applicable principle for distinguishing when 
courts may and may not examine religious questions.
20 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (1998); Gregory P. Magarian, 
How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without 
Violating the Constitution, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1903, 1945-1962 (2001); Steven C. 
Seeger, Note, Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1472 (1997).  
21 See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 Yale 
L.J. 597 (1976).
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no other identifiable reason than that adjudication would require 
inquiry into religious matters. This Article argues, however, that it 
is incoherent to speak of a general prohibition on judicial 
examination of religious questions. There are numerous contexts in 
which courts routinely and legitimately undertake factual inquiries 
into religious doctrines and practices.  The question is not whether
courts may resolve religious questions but which religious 
questions lie beyond judicial ability and authority.  This Article 
answers that question by arguing that, for both institutional and 
constitutional reasons, courts are barred from resolving normative 
questions about religion, such as the validity or truth of religious 
beliefs or the wisdom or efficacy of religious practices, but neither 
the institutional competence of the courts nor the separationist 
principle embodied in the Establishment Clause bars judicial 
resolution of positive religious questions, such as assessments of 
the content of religious doctrine, or determinations of the centrality 
or importance of a religious practice within the context of a 
religion.  In other words, on religious matters, courts may not tell 
people what they should do or believe, but they may determine, in 
the sense of making factual findings, what beliefs people hold and 
what practices they engage in. 
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of the prohibition on 
judicial examination of religious questions.  As that Part shows, the 
scope of the prohibition has increased exponentially in recent 
years, with little discussion or dissent.  Prior to Ballard, courts had 
long applied a limited common law principle of deference to 
ecclesiastical judgments, which barred courts from second-
guessing the doctrinal decisions of church bodies.  Beginning in 
the 1960s, with the Court’s decision in cases addressing disputes 
over the ownership of church property and culminating in the 
Smith decision in 1990, the principle has grown to an apparently 
absolute prohibition on judicial examination of all questions 
touching on religion.  Courts are thus said to be equally barred 
from determining normative questions, such as whether Jesus 
really was the messiah or whether Devil’s Tower really is sacred, 
as they are barred from determining positive questions, such as 
whether throwing rice is considered a central part of a wedding 
ceremony or whether Jews consider pork to be kosher.  
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Part II shows that, contrary to the Court’s language, an 
absolute prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions 
is neither possible nor advisable.  There are substantial contexts in 
which courts legitimately inquire into religious questions and could 
not apply the Religion Clauses, or the hundreds of statutes that 
give special treatment to religion and religious practices, if they 
were prohibited from doing so.  Most prominently, any 
determination of whether a belief or practice is “religious” and 
therefore subject to the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment 
Clause necessarily entails inquiry into the content of religious 
doctrines and practices, and courts routinely make such inquiries, 
notwithstanding the apparent prohibition on judicial examination 
of religious questions.  
Part III examines the argument that courts are institutionally 
incompetent to resolve religious questions. This rationale for 
prohibiting judicial assessment of religious questions depends 
crucially on a conception of law and religion as epistemologically 
distinct spheres—that is, that the validity of religious claims 
depends on faith, miracles, mystical experiences, and other 
nonrational sources, while law discovers truth exclusively through 
reason and empiricism.  Under this conception, courts cannot 
resolve religious questions because they are not susceptible to the 
analytical tools available through law.  This understanding of the 
difference between religious and legal thinking counsels in favor 
of a prohibition on judicial resolution of normative questions about 
religion.  In contrast, positive religious questions, such as those 
concerning the content of religious beliefs or the importance of a 
religious practice within the context of a religion, do not call on 
courts to employ anything other than ordinary tools of judicial 
factfinding and can be resolved through resort to traditional 
evidence, such as reliance on expert witnesses, treatises, and 
factual testimony.
Part IV examines the argument, based on the separationist 
principle embodied in the Establishment Clause bars, that courts 
are barred from resolving religious questions because such 
questions are constitutionally committed to religious bodies.  
While a judicial determination that a religious claim is true or valid 
would necessarily intrude into the sphere of religion protected by 
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the Constitution, courts neither become excessively entangled in 
religious matters nor endorse religious doctrines merely by 
describing them in positive terms.  The Religion Clauses are thus 
properly understood to prohibit judicial determinations of the truth 
or validity of religious claims but not to prohibit courts from 
making positive assessments of the content of religious doctrine 
and practices.
I.  THE CREATION AND EXPANSION OF THE PROHIBITION ON 
JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American 
common law included a generally applicable principle that courts 
should avoid deciding certain kinds of religious questions out of 
respect for the separate authority of religious bodies.  In the last 
sixty years that limited principle has grown into a seemingly 
absolute prohibition on all judicial inquiry into questions touching 
on religion, regardless of the type of question or how the question 
arises.  The expansion began in 1944 with the Court’s decision in 
Ballard, when the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise 
Clause prohibits courts from determining the truth or validity of 
religious claims.  Twenty-five years later, the Court declared that 
the Establishment Clause prohibits courts from interpreting the 
meaning of religious terms or weighing the importance of 
doctrines or practices in the context of a religion.  Although that 
principle was articulated in broad terms, for the next twenty years 
the Court appeared ambivalent about the precise scope of the 
prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions, and the 
Court continued to examine the meaning and context of religious 
doctrines and practices in determining numerous cases.  
That changed in 1990, with the Court’s decision in Smith v. 
Employment Division, which holds that courts may not examine or 
weigh the importance of religious practices in determining whether 
an individual’s rights to the free exercise of religion were violated.  
Smith’s conclusion has been understood by the lower courts to 
evince an absolute prohibition on judicial examination of religious 
questions.  Applying that prohibition, state and federal courts have 
dismissed scores of otherwise ordinary disputes—involving 
IS THERE A “RELIGIOUS QUESTION” DOCTRINE?               9
consumer fraud, child custody, employment discrimination, 
negligence, professional malpractice, and contracts—whenever 
their resolution would require any analysis of religious questions.  
A. The Common Law Origins of the Prohibition on Judicial 
Examination of Religious Questions
The principle that civil courts have no authority to adjudicate 
religious disputes dates back to medieval England, when church 
courts and crown courts existed side by side and had relatively 
distinct areas of jurisdiction. As Roscoe Pound described: 
In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the 
distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, 
between the jurisdiction of religiously organized 
Christendom and the jurisdiction of the temporal 
sovereign, that is, of a politically organized 
society, was fundamental. It seemed as natural 
and inevitable to have church courts and state 
courts, each with their own field of action and 
each, perhaps, tending to encroach on the other’s 
domain, but each having their own province in 
which they were paramount, as it seems to 
Americans to have two sets of courts, federal 
courts and state courts, operating side by side in 
the same territory, each supreme in their own 
province.22
Under the dual legal system in place in medieval England, 
common law courts, under the domain of the king, had jurisdiction 
over temporal matters and lacked authority to decide religious 
questions because such questions properly fell under the 
jurisdiction of the church and its own system of canon courts. 
22 Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Ideals and Law, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6 
(1933); see also J.H. Baker, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
138-141 (3d ed. 1990); Reverend Kenneth R. O’Brien & Daniel E. O’Brien, 
Restatement of Inter-Church-and-State Common Law, 5 The Jurist 73 (1945) 
(tracing the history of the Catholic Church’s supreme authority over internal 
church matters, free from secular supervision). 
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The longstanding division of authority between the crown’s 
courts and the church courts formed the background for the 
rejection in the seventeenth and eighteenth century of civil 
authority over questions of faith.  John Locke argued that civil 
courts have no authority to measure religious truth because such 
matters fell under the authority of religious bodies and the 
individual conscience: “And upon this ground, I affirm that the 
magistrate’s power extends not to the establishing of any articles of 
faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws.”23 This 
principle was generally accepted throughout the American 
colonies. Roger Williams thus wrote in 1644 that civil courts have 
no authority to judge the truth of religious convictions: “All civil 
states with their officers of justice, in their respective constitutions 
and administrations, are . . . essentially civil, and therefore not 
judges, governors, or defenders of the Spiritual, or Christian, State 
and worship.”24 James Madison likewise relied on what was by 
then a well-established principle in his “Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” declaring the 
proposition that a “Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of 
Religious truth” to be “an arrogant pretension falsified by the 
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the 
world.”25
Pursuant to the principle that civil courts have no authority 
over religious matters, nineteenth century courts refused to address 
the truth of religious doctrines,26 to decide whether the Christian 
sacraments had been properly administered,27 to enforce spiritual 
obligations,28 or to compel church officials to perform religious 
23 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1690), reprinted in THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 52 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).
24 Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent, Of Persecution for Cause of 
Conscience (1644), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, 
at 48. 
25 Madison, supra note 15.  
26 See, e.g., Trustees of East Norway Lake Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. Halvorson, 44 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1890).
27 Reformed  Protestant Dutch Church v. Bradford, 8 Cow. 457 (N.Y. 
1826).
28 Congregation of the Roman Catholic Church v. Martin, 4 Rob. 62 (La. 
1843).
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duties.29  When such questions about religion arose, the courts 
deferred to the final decisions of religious authorities, just as the 
common law courts of England would have deferred to church 
courts on matters within their jurisdiction. 
In ways that plainly would be anathema under contemporary 
understandings of the place of religion in law, American courts in 
the nineteenth century understood the bar on examining the truth of 
religious doctrines to be necessary to protect the dominant position 
of Christianity.  Christianity was said to be part of the common law 
and, as a result, the truth of Christian doctrines could not be 
challenged in court.30  Blasphemy against Christianity and the 
Christian Bible remained a common law crime until the early 
twentieth century, and convictions were upheld for calling Jesus a 
bastard,31 for characterizing the Bible to be a fable,32 and for 
publishing a satire of the New Testament.33  Alleged blasphemers 
29 Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 31 Ill. 25 (1863); see generally William 
George Torpey, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 118-
121 (1948).
30 Rector v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (“[T]his is a 
Christian nation.”); Updegrath, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 394 (“Christianity, general 
Christianity, is and always has been a part of the common law of Pennsylvania, . 
. .  not Christianity with an established church and tithes and spiritual courts, but 
Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men.”); see generally Tim A. 
Thomas, Christianity, 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common Law § 8 (“[I]t has been said 
that general Christianity is, and always has been, a part of the common law.”). 
See generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 
16 Law & Hist. L. Rev. 27 (1998). 
31 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns 290 (N.Y. 1811).
32 Updegrath v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Penn. 1824). 
33 State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39 (Me. 1921); see generally Robert A. 
Brazener, Annotation, Validity of Blasphemy Statutes or Ordinances, 41 A.L.R. 
3d 519 (1972); 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 513 (defining blasphemy as 
“maliciously reviling God or religion . . . [and] involves speaking evil of the 
Deity with an impious purpose to derogate the divine Majesty”); Banner, supra
note 30.  Blasphemy was understood to be a secular crime, not a religious 
offense, because public ridicule of Christianity was seen as a threat to the peace 
due to Christianity’s dominant position. See, e.g., Updegrath, 11 Serg. & R. at 
394 (stating that because Christianity “is the popular religion of the country, an 
insult on which would be indictable, as directly tending to disturb the peace”);
Torpey, supra note 29, at 59 (“Blasphemy is a temporal offense. Violation of 
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could not defend themselves on the ground that they had spoken 
the truth.34 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in 1824, 
if the truth of Christian beliefs were open to attack in court, no 
testimony could be credited because of the requirement that 
witnesses swear an oath of truthfulness on the Christian Bible:
[A]ll false oaths, all tests by oath, in the common 
form, by the book, would cease to be indictable as 
perjury; the indictment must state the oath to be 
on the holy Evangelists of Almighty God; the 
accused, on his trial, might argue that the book by 
which he was sworn, so far from being holy writ, 
was a pack of lies, containing as little truth as 
Robinson Crusoe. And is every jury in the box to 
decide as a fact, whether the scriptures are of 
divine origin?35
Judicial examination of the validity of Christian teachings was thus 
prohibited because the truth of Christian doctrine was understood 
to be an unchallengeable foundation of the law.
The principle that courts could not delve into religious 
questions did not, however, preclude judicial pronouncements on 
the falsity of religious doctrines and practices outside mainstream 
Christianity.  For instance, in 1922 an Oklahoma prosecution for 
fortune telling was upheld against a practitioner of Spiritualism, 
notwithstanding the defendant’s claim that her religion involved 
the practice of communicating with departed spirits.36 The court 
rejected the contention that communicating with spirits was a 
protected form of religious freedom, describing the defendant’s 
avowed religion as a “system of speculative philosophy, attended 
religious precepts will not be punished as such. Punishment follows because 
such attacks tend to destroy the peace of society.”). 
34 Updegrath, 11 Serg. & R. at 394.
35 Ibid.; see also Mockus, 113 A. at 43 (defending position of Christianity 
as part of the common law on the ground that “[j]udicial tribunals, anxious to 
discover and apply the truth, require those who are to give testimony in courts of 
justice to be sworn by an oath which recognizes deity”). 
36 McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 568 (Okla. Crim. Ct. 1922).
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with superstitious credulity and . . . tinged with hypocrisy.37  Other 
courts characterized claims of supernatural abilities to contact the 
dead, or to heal illnesses through psychic powers, to be 
fraudulent,38 as something only lunatics could believe.39
In addition to protecting the dominant role of Christianity, the 
reluctance of nineteenth-century courts to resolve religious 
questions served the Madisonian goal of maintaining the distinct 
spheres of religion and law.  In 1872, in Watson v. Jones, the 
Supreme Court held, as a matter of federal common law, that 
courts should not resolve property disputes between rival church 
bodies by reference to religious doctrines.40  The case arose as a 
result of a schism among a church’s members over the issue of 
slavery, which resulted in two competing groups claiming 
ownership of the church property.  The Supreme Court overturned 
the lower court’s ruling that the property belonged to the group 
that more closely followed the original teachings of the church.  In 
reaching this conclusion, Watson speaks in terms of the relative 
jurisdictions of the civil courts and religious authorities, stating 
that “civil courts exercise no jurisdiction” over disputes that are 
“strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,” because such 
matters must be left to church authorities to resolve.41
In ruling that the property dispute should not be decided based 
on a court’s assessment of the litigants’ relative adherence to 
church doctrines, Watson emphasizes that courts are not absolutely 
barred from examining religious doctrines in other contexts.  The 
Court contrasted judicial reliance on religious doctrine in deciding 
37 Ibid.; but see id. at 570 (Matson, J., concurring) (“Can the state 
constitutionally prohibit communication with the spirit world, which, so far as I 
am advised, we are at peace?”).
38 Fay v. Lambourne, 108 N.Y.S. 874 (1908).
39 People v. Elmer, 67 N.W. 550 (Mich. 1896); 135 F.1, 10-11 (sustaining 
a prosecution against a practitioner of spiritual healing in which the government 
bore the burden of proving that the defendant did not actually possess the power
to heal diseases through mental powers alone); see generally Gregory G. Sarno, 
Regulation of Astrology, Clairvoyancy, Fortunetelling, and the Like, 91 
A.L.R.3d 766 (1979).
40 13 U.S. (Wall.) 679 (1872).
41 Id.  at 733. 
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a dispute between competing church sects and the hypothetical 
case of a “pious man” who placed property in trust in a written 
instrument specifying that it be used by a congregation committed 
to Trinitarian Christian.  In the latter case, the Watson Court stated, 
courts should be available to “prevent that property from being 
used as a means of support and dissemination of the Unitarian 
doctrine.”42  A court’s duty in that hypothetical case would be “to 
inquire whether the party accused of violating the trust is holding 
or teaching a different doctrine.”43 Watson thus holds that fidelity 
to religious doctrines cannot serve as a rule of decision for 
adjudicating property disputes but courts may nonetheless inquire 
into questions of religious doctrine and practice when such 
questions arise in the ordinary course of litigation and do not 
require judgments about the relative merits of religious claims.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American law had 
thus developed a common law principle that the civil courts had no 
authority over religious matters, and the courts therefore should 
avoid resolving religious questions in deference to proper church 
authorities.  This principle had limited applications: it prevented 
courts from directly meddling in the internal affairs of mainstream 
Christian churches and prevented parties from challenging the truth 
of Christian doctrines.  The principle did not prevent courts from 
declaring non-Christian religious claims to be false, nor was it not 
understood to prevent courts from making factual inquiries into 
religious doctrines and practices, Christian and otherwise, when 
such questions arose in the ordinary course of litigation and did not 
call on courts to make judgments about the merits of religious 
doctrines and practices.
B. The Expansion of the Prohibition Against Judicial Resolution 
of Religious Questions
Beginning with United States v. Ballard,44 decided in 1944, 
the Supreme Court issued a series of cases that constitutionalized 
42 Id. at 723.
43 Id. at 724.
44 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
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and greatly expanded the principle that courts should not delve into 
questions of religious doctrine.  In Ballard, the Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause bars courts from determining the validity or 
truth of religious claims or doctrines. In 1969, in Presbyterian 
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church,45 the Court announced a much more sweeping rule that 
the Establishment Clause bars factual inquiry into the content of 
religious doctrines or practices, either to interpret religious 
doctrine or to determine the relative importance or centrality of a 
particular religious belief or practice to a believer. Over the twenty 
years following Presbyterian Church, the Court did not apply that 
rule literally and continued to inquire into the content and context 
of religious doctrines and practices in cases under the Free 
Exercise Clause and other areas.  That changed in 1990, when the 
Court relied on the broad prohibition against judicial inquiry into 
religious questions in Employment Division v. Smith to 
substantially revise Free Exercise doctrine.  
1. United States v. Ballard: The Constitutional Prohibition on 
Judicial Assessment of Religious Truths.  — Ballard arose out of 
charges of mail fraud against followers of Guy Ballard, founder of 
the “I Am” movement.46 According to the indictment, members of 
the I Am movement mailed literature in which they claimed that 
Ballard had been chosen by Saint Germain to transmit divine 
messages to mankind, that the tracts of the I Am movement had 
been dictated directly by Jesus, and that, by virtue of his 
supernatural attainments, Ballard possessed the power to cure 
diseases and heal injuries.47 The indictment alleged that Ballard’s 
followers knew these claims to be false and made them in order to 
swindle people of their money.48 The court of appeals ruled that 
the defendants could be found guilty only if the jury determined 
that the defendants’ claims were factually false. 
45 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
46 A fascinating examination of the factual background to the Ballard
case and the history of the I Am movement can be found in John T. Noonan, Jr., 
THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 141-156 (1998); see also Weiss, supra note 12. 
47 322 U.S. at 79-80. 
48 Id. at 80.
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Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the Religion 
Clauses prohibit any inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious 
claims: 
The religious views espoused by respondents may 
seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most 
people. But if these doctrines are subject to trial 
before a jury charged with finding their truth or 
falsity, then the same can be done with the 
religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of 
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden 
domain.  . . . The miracles of the New Testament, 
the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power 
of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of 
many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in 
a hostile environment found those teachings false, 
little indeed would be left of religious freedom.49
The Supreme Court held that the defendants could be convicted of 
fraud if they did not sincerely believe their religious claims, 
without any inquiry by the jury into the truth of those claims.50
Ballard thus announces that the Constitution cordons off a 
“forbidden domain” that courts may not enter: courts may not 
determine the truth or falsity of religious claims.  Although Ballard
is consistent with the earlier common law prohibition on judicial 
resolution of religious questions, it locates a constitutional source 
for the prohibition—the protection accorded by the Free Exercise 
Clause to individuals against punishment by the government for 
holding religious beliefs offensive to the majority. 
2. The Church Property Cases: The Constitutional 
Prohibition on Judicial Examination of Religious Doctrines.  —
In a series of cases addressing church property disputes, the Court 
49 Id.. at 87-88. 
50 Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that allowing a conviction 
based on insincerity does not adequately protect religious freedom. In Jackson’s 
view, the question of whether a defendant acted sincerely in making a religious 
claim cannot be sufficiently distinguished from the truth of the claim. For a 
discussion of the problems associated with ascertaining religious sincerity, see
John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 
University of Ill. L. Rev. 713; see also Weiss, supra note 12. 
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constitutionalized and expanded the rule announced in Watson v. 
Jones that courts should not resolve property disputes between 
competing church factions by reference to religious doctrines.51
The leading case, Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,52 arose as a result of a schism 
in the Presbyterian Church, in which title to a church was claimed 
both by the national church body and by the local church 
organization, which had broken with the national church over its 
decision to ordain women. The property dispute made its way to 
the Georgia Supreme Court, which applied its longstanding rule 
that church property is held in trust for the central church 
organization as long as it adheres to the original church doctrines.53
The Georgia court awarded the property to the local church on the 
ground that the national church body had substantially departed 
from its doctrines by allowing the ordination of women.  The 
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “First Amendment values 
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to 
turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious 
doctrine and practice.”54
At the level of its holding, Presbyterian Church simply 
restates Watson v. Jones, rejecting Georgia’s departure-from-
doctrine rule, which allowed a court faced with a property dispute 
between church factions to favor the church body that more closely 
adhered to the church’s original theological doctrines.  Such a 
substantive rule of decision amounted to a governmental 
endorsement of one set of religious factions—conservative 
factions—at the expense of progressive factions, violating the 
principle of neutrality that the law “is committed to the support of 
51 See generally Robert J. Bohner, Note, Religious Property Disputes and 
Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards a Narrow Application of the Neutral 
Principles Approach, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 949 (1990); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church 
Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 Fordham L. 
Rev. 335 (1986).
52 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
53 Although the departure-from-doctrine rule had been rejected in Watson, 
that decision was based on federal common law and was binding on federal 
courts only.  
54 Id. at 449. 
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no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”55  Yet, in rejecting the 
departure-from-doctrine rule, the Court’s decision in Presbyterian 
Church appears to adopt a broad rule that the Religion Clauses bar 
any judicial inquiry into religious doctrines: “[T]he departure-
from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires 
the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion—
the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance 
of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment 
forbids civil courts from playing such a role.”56 The Court thus 
characterized judicial examination of religious questions as the 
“forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church 
doctrine.”57
In Presbyterian Church and the subsequent church property 
cases, the Court embraced a prohibition on judicial interpretation 
of religious doctrine in order to foreclose the possibility that a 
court might rule that an authoritative doctrinal decision of a 
religious body is incorrect.  In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese 
v. Milivojevich, the Court overturned the judgment of the Illinois 
Supreme Court that local church property belonged to the 
American branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church rather than to 
the mother church in Yugoslavia.  As the Court stated, the fatal 
flaw of the Illinois court was that its decision “rests upon an 
impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest 
ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues 
in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into 
church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.”58
These cases can be understood simply to reject the power of courts 
to disagree with the religious judgment of church bodies.
55 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728; see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (the Establishment Clause 
expresses a conviction “requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict 
neutrality toward theological questions”). 
56 Id. at 450.
57 Id. at 451; see also id. at 440 (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits civil courts from “assessing the relative significance to the religion” of 
a particular religious tenet).   
58 426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976)
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The language of the decisions, however, goes much farther in 
rejecting judicial examination of religious doctrines.  In a one-
paragraph concurrence in Presbyterian Church, Justice Harlan 
sough to make clear that the Court’s opinion should not be read to 
preclude a court from interpreting and enforcing legal documents 
containing religious terms, at least where such terms are express 
and clear.59 In holding out the possibility that a court could 
construe religious terms appearing in deeds or wills, Harlan relied 
on Watson’s hypothetical of the “pious man.”60 Cases following 
Presbyterian Church, however, eliminate any residual authority for 
courts to construe religious terms, however clearly expressed.61
The Court approved two methods for resolving church property 
disputes, both of which entail “no inquiry into religious 
doctrine,”62 and “no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the 
ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.”63 Courts may 
either adopt a policy of deference to the church institution with 
authority to decide the property question and underlying religious 
doctrinal questions or courts may decide the property dispute by 
applying “neutral principles of law” that do not entail any 
consideration of religious doctrinal matters.64
59 Id. at 453 (“I do not, however, read the Court’s opinion to go further to 
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids civilian courts from enforcing a 
deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions limiting a 
religious organization’s use of the property which is granted.”) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).   
60 Ibid.
61 See Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., 396 U.S. 367, 369 n.2 
(1970) (Brennan, J. concurring) (“Only express conditions that may be effected 
without consideration of doctrine are civilly enforceable.”).
62 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1978).
63 Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J. concurring).
64 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
708 (1976) (“For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without 
extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decision 
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal with a church of hierarchical polity, but 
must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the 
religious issues of doctrine or polity between them.”); Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 
(“The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust 
and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil 
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In the broad form articulated by the Court in these cases, the 
prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions goes far 
beyond both the common law prohibition and the rule announced 
in Ballard.  Whereas Ballard prohibits courts from judging the 
truth of religious doctrines, the church property cases bar courts 
from making any “inquiry” into religious doctrines, from 
“interpreting” religious doctrines, and from determining the 
“importance” of religious doctrine to believers.  The church 
property cases further alter the constitutional source of the 
prohibition.  Whereas Ballard is based principally on free exercise 
principles, the broad prohibition on judicial examination of 
religious questions articulated in the church property cases is 
grounded primarily on Establishment Clause principles, in that 
examination of religious questions is said to involve excessive 
entanglement with religion and to be constitutionally assigned to 
religious authorities.65  The church property cases thus depart 
substantially from Watson, which had announced that religious 
bodies “come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary 
associations.”66  In announcing that courts may not purport to 
resolve religious questions, the church property cases announce a 
rule uniquely applicable to religious entities.
3. Thomas, Hernandez, and County of Allegheny: Confusion 
Over the Permissible Scope of Judicial Examination of Religious 
Questions.  —  Although the church property cases broadly declare 
that courts must not engage in the “forbidden process of 
courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, 
and practice.”).
65 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.  There is some dispute among 
commentators regarding which of the two Religion Clauses form the basis for 
the church property cases. Compare Douglas Laycock, Towards a General 
Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1392-1996 (1981) 
(arguing that the church property cases rest on the Free Exercise Clause because 
“the primary constitutional violation [is] interfering with the right of the original 
church, which included both factions, to resolve the controversy itself.”) with
Tribe, supra note 14 (discussing the church property cases as Establishment 
Clause cases) and Esbeck, supra note 14 at 42-58 (arguing that the church 
property cases are based on the separationist principles of the Establishment 
Clause). 
66 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 714.
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interpreting and weighing church doctrine,”67 in the first twenty 
years after issuing those opinions, the Court continued to consider 
and weigh the importance of religious doctrines and practices in its 
analysis of cases under the Religion Clauses.  The rule against 
judicial review of religious matters appeared to be another instance 
of what the Court candidly recognized as its tendency to make 
overly broad pronouncements in cases under the Religion 
Clauses.68
The Court frequently examined the content of religious 
doctrines and practices in Free Exercise Clause cases. Until Smith, 
the Court applied a compelling interest test in evaluating free 
exercise challenges to the application of neutral governmental 
laws, requiring courts to assess the significance of the burden on 
the plaintiff’s religious practice and weigh that burden against the 
strength of the government’s interest in applying the neutral law to 
the challenger.  For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held 
that Wisconsin’s compulsory education requirement violated the 
free exercise rights of the Old Order Amish because the Amish 
religion prohibited sending teenagers to public schools.69 In order 
to reach that conclusion, the Court gave careful examination to the 
doctrines and practices of Amish religion, noting the “strong 
evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating [the 
Amish’s] entire mode of life,” and describing the biblical 
command “Be not conformed to this world” to be “fundamental to 
the Amish faith.”70  Under the Court’s free exercise cases, judicial 
examination of the content and significance of religious practices 
was an essential aspect of the constitutional test.
67 393 U.S. at 451; see also id. at 440 (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits civil courts from “assessing the relative significance to the religion” of 
a particular religious tenet).   
68 See Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970) (“The considerable 
inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may 
have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear 
in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general 
principles.”). 
69 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
70 Id. at 219.
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In several cases following the church property case, the Court 
grappled with the contradiction of both requiring and prohibiting 
judicial examination of religious doctrines and practices.  For 
instance, Thomas v. Review Board involved the free exercise rights 
of a Jehovah’s Witness who was denied unemployment 
compensation after quitting his job, claiming that his religious 
beliefs forbade him from participating in military production.71  To 
establish that the denial of benefits burdened his religion, Thomas 
was required to present some evidence about the content of his 
religion—in the words of the Court, to show that he “terminated 
his work because of an honest conviction that such work was 
forbidden by his religion.”72 The state attempted to rebut Thomas’s 
characterization of his religious beliefs by demonstrating that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses do not actually forbid military work, offering 
testimony of one of Thomas’s co-workers and fellow Jehovah’s 
Witness.  The Court, however, held that assessing the content of 
Jehovah’s Witness doctrine was beyond the constitutional 
competence of the judiciary: “Particularly in this sensitive area, it 
is not within the judicial function and competence to inquire 
whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly 
perceived the commands of their common faith.  Courts are not 
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”73
The contradiction in the Court’s requirement that free exercise 
plaintiffs demonstrate a burden on their religious beliefs or 
practices while simultaneously prohibiting judicial examination of 
the content and importance of religious beliefs and practices can be 
seen most clearly in the course of a single paragraph in the Court’s 
opinion in Hernandez v. Commissioner.74  That case involved the 
disallowance of tax deductions for “auditing” and training sessions 
mandated by Church of Scientology teachings.  In addressing the 
claim that the disallowance violated the taxpayers’ free exercise 
rights, the Court articulated the constitutional test as follows: “The 
free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a 
substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief 
71 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
72 Id. at 716.
73 Ibid.
74 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
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or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest 
justifies the burden.”75  The Court apparently recognized that 
requiring proof that a religious practice is “central” to the 
plaintiff’s religion might be understood to call for judicial 
examination of the content and importance of religious beliefs and 
practices, as the next sentence in the opinion seeks to forbid such 
examination: “It is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.”76  The next 
two sentences of the opinion, however, demonstrate that the Court 
was nonetheless willing to makes its own assessment of the 
doctrines and teachings of the Church of Scientology: “We do, 
however, have doubts whether the alleged burden imposed by the 
deduction disallowance on the Scientologists’ practices is a 
substantial one.  Neither the payment nor the receipt of taxes is 
forbidden by the Scientology faith generally, and Scientology does 
not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection with auditing or 
training sessions specifically.”77
Hernandez thus appears to hold that (1) free exercise plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that a burdened religious practice or belief is 
central to his or her religion, but (2) a court cannot determine 
whether the practice or belief actually is central to the plaintiff’s 
religion, yet (3) courts may nonetheless assess whether the 
plaintiff’s religion would consider the burden imposed by the 
challenged governmental action to be substantial.  If nothing else, 
Hernandez demonstrates that the Court remained baffled over the 
extent to which judicial inquiry is allowed into religious doctrines 
and practices. 
In the same term that Hernandez was decided, the Court 
expressed similar ambivalence about whether it should decide 
Establishment Clause cases without examining religious doctrines.  
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a display of a crèche in a county courthouse 
and a menorah in a local government building.78 In deciding 
75 Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
76 Ibid.
77 Id. at 699.
78 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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whether these displays violated the Establishment Cause, the Court 
devoted considerable attention to the religious meaning and 
content of the displays.  The majority opinion parsed the phrase 
appearing on the crèche—“Glory to God in the Highest”—to 
express the sectarian sentiment “Glory to God because of the birth 
of Jesus.”79 The majority concluded that “[t]his praise to God in 
Christian terms is indisputably religious.”80 Based on its 
conclusion that the crèche conveyed a “patently Christian 
message,” the majority found that its display on public property 
violates the Establishment Clause.  Likewise, in considering the 
constitutionality of the display of the menorah, Justice Blackmun’s 
concurring opinion examined voluminous evidence, including 
expert testimony, regarding the religious meaning of the 
menorah.81  Dissenting on the unconstitutionality of the display of 
the crèche and concurring on the constitutionality of the display of 
the menorah, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices White and Scalia, criticized the Court for undertaking 
the “inappropriate task of saying what every religious symbol 
means. . . . This Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology 
board, and I question both the wisdom and the constitutionality of 
its so doing.”82  Justice Blackmun defended his examination of the 
religious meaning of the menorah, stating that “[a]ny inquiry 
concerning the government’s use of a religious object . . . requires 
a review of the factual record concerning the religious object.”83
The Court thus expressed division over whether it is 
constitutionally appropriate for a court to examine the content of 
religious doctrines and practices in deciding cases under the 
Establishment Clause.
4. Employment Division v. Smith: The Reshaping of the Free 
Exercise Clause to Avoid Examination of Religious Doctrines and 
Practices.  —  Although the opinions issued by the Court in the 
first two decades following the church property cases express 
considerable ambivalence over whether courts are constitutionally 
79 Id. at 598.
80 Ibid.
81 Id. at 613-621.
82 Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83 Id. at 614 n.60 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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allowed to examine the content, meaning, and importance of 
religious doctrines and practices, none of the cases in those 
decades appears to take literally the church property cases’ broad 
pronouncements of an absolute prohibition on judicial examination 
of religious doctrines and practices.  That changed with the Court’s 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, issued the term 
following Hernandez and County of Allegheny.  Smith broadly 
holds that courts are constitutionally barred from making any 
factual inquiries into the content or significance of religious 
doctrines and practices and that, as a result, the standard for 
deciding free exercise cases cannot depend on the significance of 
religious doctrines and practices in the context of a religion.  
In Smith, the Court overturned the compelling interest test 
applied in cases like Yoder in large part because it required courts 
to determine the significance of religious practices and doctrines.84
As the Court stated, “we have warned that courts must not presume 
to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion.”85
Because courts must not determine the religious significance of an 
allegedly burdened practice, the Court concluded that, “[i]f the 
‘compelling interest’ test is to be applied at all . . . it must be 
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously 
commanded.”  The Court thus announced that courts are 
constitutionally barred from distinguishing religious practices and 
doctrines that are central to a religion from those that are trivial—
in the example of the Court, the Free Exercise Clause cannot be 
read to offer differing degrees of protection to the practice of 
throwing rice at weddings than to the wedding ceremony itself.86
Because courts are constitutionally barred from determining the 
significance of religious practices, they cannot balance the 
84 Cf. Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Living in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 59 (1993) (Smith “is a decision about institutional arrangements more 
than substantive merits . . . holding that judicially manageable standards for the 
resolution of Free Exercise exemption claims are lacking.”). 
85 494 U.S. at 887.
86 Id. at 887 n.4. 
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significance of a governmental interest against the significance of a 
burdened religious practice.87
In disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of the compelling 
interest test, both the concurring and dissenting Justices agreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that it is constitutionally 
impermissible for a court to determine the importance of a 
religious practice within the context of a religion.88  The most 
prominent academic critics and defenders of the decision similarly 
agreed that the Free Exercise Clause does not require courts to 
determine the religious centrality of religious doctrines and 
practices.89
Smith thus confirms that the prohibition against judicial 
examination of religious questions articulated in the church 
property cases should be understood to be broad and absolute.  
Whereas the church property cases applied the prohibition to 
invalidate a rule of decision calling for examination of religious 
87 494 U.S. at 889 n.5 (“[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges 
will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of 
a religious practice.”).
88 Id. at 906-907 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 919 (Blackmun,  J., 
dissenting). 
89 For instance, Douglas Laycock, a vocal critic of Smith, agreed with the 
Court that “[a] threshold requirement of centrality would indeed be a mistake.”  
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32; see 
also Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction, 
81 Marq. L. Rev. 461, 469 (1998) (“I am skeptical about the usefulness of 
requiring a ‘central belief or practice.”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise 
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1148 (1990) (“[A] 
court faced with a free exercise claim is not required to determine, in the 
abstract . . . how central a religious practice is.”); Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and 
Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 Neb. L. Rev. 
651, 668 (1991) (“Judicial inquiry into such matters as how important a specific 
religious tenet is for a believer or how heavily the government imposed burden 
affects a particular individual’s adherence to his religious precepts places the 
courts in an undesirably intrusive posture.”).  Similarly, Ira Lupu, generally 
supportive of Smith, agreed with the Court that “any imaginable process for 
resolving disputes over centrality creates the spectre of religious experts giving 
conflicting testimony about the significance of a religious practice, with the 
state’s decisionmaker choosing among them.”  Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: 
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 
933, 959 (1989).  
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doctrines to decide property disputes, Smith applies the prohibition 
to cases arising under the Free Exercise Clause, holding that even 
in deciding cases about religious freedom, courts cannot examine 
the religious content of the practices and doctrines at issue.  As the 
lower courts were quick grasp, if the content and significance of 
religious practices cannot be examined in addressing the scope of 
religious freedom, examination of the content and significance of 
religious practices and doctrine must be off-limits in all cases in 
which such questions could conceivably arise.  
C. “This Court Is Constitutionally Barred from Inquiring into the 
Meaning of These Words”: The Application of an Absolute 
Prohibition on Judicial Inquiry into Religious Questions in the 
Lower Courts
In 1872, in deciding Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court 
stated that cases involving religious questions were “happily rare 
in our courts.”90  Since the Court’s decision in Smith, however, 
there have been scores of cases that state and federal courts have 
characterized as raising religious questions prohibited to judicial 
inquiry.  The lower courts assume that Smith and the church 
property cases establish an absolute prohibition and routinely 
dismiss any case that would require judicial inquiry into the 
content or significance of religious beliefs and practices. As 
Laurence Tribe uncritically stated, “American judicial decisions 
have tended to treat anything even resembling inquiry into 
[religious questions] as part of the forbidden religious realm.”91
The expanded prohibition on judicial examination of religious 
questions has led state and federal courts to dismiss disputes in 
seemingly every area of litigation—including consumer fraud, 
child custody and divorce, employment discrimination, torts, 
professional malpractice, and contracts—whenever their resolution 
would require analysis of religious questions.  It has also led courts 
to construe statutes to avoid requiring any inquiry into religious 
90 Watson v. Jones , 13 U.S. (Wall.) 679, 713 (1872). 
91 Tribe, supra note 14 at § 14-11 at 1236 n.67.
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questions and to invalidate statutes that require such inquiry.  
Below is a representative sampling of the cases.   
1. Contract cases.  — In numerous cases, contracts have been 
deemed unenforceable because they contain religious terms that 
courts have held they are barred from construing.  For instance, in 
Elmora Hebrew Center v. Fishman, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court upheld the dismissal of a breach of contract action involving 
a contract requiring a rabbi to “perform all normal rabbinical duties 
incumbent upon a Rabbi of a traditional Jewish Congregation.”92
As the Court held, judicial construction of the contract would 
require the court to make “incursions into religious questions that 
would be impermissible under the first amendment.”93  Similarly, 
in Pearson v. Church of God, a retired minister argued that he was 
entitled to a pension under the terms of the pension agreement 
because he maintained a “ministry” even though his “pastoral 
license” had been revoked.94  Concluding that the relevant terms in 
the pension agreement were religious, the court dismissed the case, 
stating that “this court is constitutionally barred from inquiring into 
the meaning of these words.”95  Courts thus profess a complete 
inability to construe the meaning of religious terms and dismiss 
any contract action calling for construction of such terms.96
92 593 A.2d 725, 727 (N.J. 1991).
93 Id. at 730.
94 458 S.E.2d 68 (S.Car. Ct. App. 1995).
95 Id. at 70.
96 See also Basich v. Bd of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995) (dismissing breach of contact action); Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Lindsey E. 
Blenkhorn, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr 
Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 189  (2002); Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in 
Halacha, Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 Md. L. Rev. 312 (1992); 
Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial 
Agreements, 32 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 359 (1999); David J. Overstreet, 
Note, Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical Examination of 
Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric’s Breach of Contract Claim Against 
a Religious Organization, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1996); Jodi M. Solovy, 
Comment, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and Divorce:  Constitutional 
Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 493 (1996); 
Lawrence M. Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing Religious 
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2. Family law cases.  — Questions about religion frequently 
arise in child custody cases, when one parent attempts to use the 
other parent’s religion against him or her.  In many cases, one 
parent has argued that the other practices a religion that is not in 
the best interests of the child, but the courts have generally refused 
to examine a parent’s religion except when presented with clear 
evidence that particular religious practices pose a threat to the life 
of the child.97  In other cases, courts have refused to determine 
whether a custodial parent violated prenuptial or divorce 
agreements mandating that children be raised according to the 
commands of a particular religion.98  For instance, Zummo v. 
Zummo, involved the construction of a divorce order prohibiting 
the husband from taking the children “to religious services 
contrary to the Jewish faith.”99 After the father took the children to 
Catholic services, the mother sought to enforce the order, but the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court held the dispute nonjusticiable: 
The father is prohibited from taking his children 
to “religious services contrary to the Jewish 
faith.” What constitutes a “religious service”? 
Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 229 
(1984).
97 See generally George G. Blum, Annotation, Religion as Factor in 
Visitation Cases, 95 A.L.R.5th 533 (2002); Thomas J. Cunningham,
Considering Religion As a Factor in Foster Care in the Aftermath of 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 53 (1994); Jordan C. 
Paul, “You Get the House.  I Get the Car.  You Get the Kids.  I Get Their Souls.”  
The Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of 
Custodial Parents, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 583  (1989); Karel Rocha, Should 
Religious Upbringing Antenuptial Agreements Be Legally Enforceable?, 11 J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 145 (2000); Jocelyn E. Strauber, Note, A Deal Is a Deal: 
Antenuptial Agreements Regarding the Religious Upbringing of Children Should 
Be Enforceable, 47 Duke L.J. 971 (1998); Martin Weiss and Robert Abramoff, 
The Enforceability of Religious Upbringing Agreements, 25 John Marshall L. 
Rev. 655 (1992).
98 See Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997); Zummo v. 
Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1990); Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 339 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996); see generally Martin Weiss and Robert Abramoff, The 
Enforceability of Religious Upbringing Agreements, 25 John Marshall L. Rev. 
655 (1992).
99 Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1142 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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Which are “contrary” to the Jewish faith? What 
for that matter is the “Jewish” faith? Orthodox, 
Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, 
Messianic, Humanistic, Secular and other Jewish 
sects might differ widely on this point. . . . Both 
the subject matter and the ambiguities of the order 
make excessive entanglement in religious matters 
inevitable if the order is to be enforced.100
The court thus held that religious upbringing agreements are 
unenforceable because it is constitutionally impermissible for 
courts to determine what practices are consistent or inconsistent 
with religious faiths.
3. Tort cases.  — Courts have refused to adjudicate negligence 
claims against churches, religious therapists, and faith healers 
whenever the reasonableness of an actor’s conduct can be said to 
depend in any measure on religious standards.101  For instance, 
100 Id. at 1146. 
101 See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(dismissing a malpractice claim against pastor for allegedly touching twelve 
year old girl during pastoral counsel, holding that adjudicating a clergy 
malpractice claim would unconstitutionally “require the Court or jury to define 
and express the standard of care to be followed by other reasonable Presbyterian 
clergy of the community”); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) 
(dismissing clergy malpractice claim); DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ, 
890 P.2d 214, 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a cleric could not be held 
liable for malpractice if his massage of the minor plaintiff “was engaged in 
solely in a sincere effort to facilitate the minor’s communication with God”); 
Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) 
(dismissing tort of outrage claim brought against church for statements made 
during excommunication); see also Martin R. Bartel, Clergy Malpractice After 
Nally: “Touch Not My Anointed, and to My Prophets Do No Harm,” 35 Vill. L. 
Rev. 535 (1990); Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liability for 
Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 97 (1991); C. 
Eric Funston, Note, Made Out of  Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the 
Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 Cal. W. L. Rev. 507 (1983); Sue Ganske 
Graziano, Clergy Malpractice, 12 Whittier L. Rev. 349 (1991); Scott C. 
Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219 (2000); James K. Lehman, Note, Clergy 
Malpractice: A Constitutional Approach, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 459 (1990); Jeremy 
Pomeroy, Note, Reason, Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith 
and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1111 (1992); Kelly Beers 
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courts have held negligence claims against religious counselors 
and spiritual healers to be nonjusticiable because they would 
require courts to undertake prohibited inquiry into the standard of 
care applicable to religious counselors.102  Similarly, courts have 
held that they cannot adjudicate claims that a church negligently 
hired or supervised a priest accused of molesting children because 
the standard of care applicable to a church in its employment 
decisions might require examination of religious doctrines.103
4. Consumer fraud cases.  —  Courts have held that consumer 
fraud statutes prohibiting the false labeling of food to be kosher 
(i.e., ritually fit for consumption under Orthodox Jewish dietary 
standards) violate the Establishment Clause, among other reasons, 
because the enforcement of such statutes may require courts to 
determine whether food was prepared in compliance with Jewish 
law.104 Although courts plainly have power to determine whether 
Rouse, Note,  Clergy Malpractice Claims: A New Problem for Religious 
Organizations, 16 N. Ky. L. Rev. 383 (1989).
102 Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 
1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“[A]djudication of the present case would require the 
court to extensively investigate and evaluate religious tenets and doctrines: first, 
to establish the standard of care of an ‘ordinary’ Christian Science practitioner; 
and second, to determine whether [the defendants] deviated from those 
standards. We believe that the first amendment precludes such an intrusive 
inquiry by the civil courts into religious matters.”). 
103 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (dismissing negligent 
hiring claim against Catholic church); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 
(Wisc. 1997) (dismissing negligent supervision claim against Catholic church); 
see generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the 
Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219 (2000).
104 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rabbi Luzer Weiss (2d 
Cir. 2002); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 
(4th Cir. 1995); Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353 
(N.J. 1992); see generally Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the 
Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?, 26 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. (1992); 
Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass the Lemon Test?: 
The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed Statutes, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 
337 (1998); Gerald F. Masoudi, Comment, Kosher Food Regulation and the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667 (1993); 
Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 951 (1997); Catherine 
IS THERE A “RELIGIOUS QUESTION” DOCTRINE?               32
food is properly labeled to be organic or low-fat, and although 
older cases had upheld state kosher laws,105 all courts to address 
the issue since Smith have held those laws to be unconstitutional 
because they would require courts to interpret religious doctrine.  
In the words of one court, to determine whether food is kosher 
“would require the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process 
of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.”106
5. Employment discrimination cases. — Employment 
discrimination claims against religious organizations are frequently 
dismissed because they might call upon courts to evaluate whether 
religious doctrines played any role in the challenged employment 
decision.  Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
religious organizations cannot be sued for discriminating on the 
basis of religion, but they remain subject to liability for 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.107
When an employee brings a discrimination claim against a 
religious employer, however, the employer may assert that the 
challenged employment decision was not made on the prohibited 
basis of race, sex, or national origin, but instead was made because 
Beth Sullivan, Are Kosher Food Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C. Envtl. 
Aff. L. Rev. 201 (1993).
105 See, e.g., People v. Goldberg, 163 N.Y.S. 663 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 
1916).
106 Barghout, 66 F. 3d at 1337 (“To reach those questions would require 
the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing 
church doctrine.”); Commack (holding that the kosher regulations “require the 
State to take an official position on religious doctrine”).
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; see, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs 
to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 
21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 275 (1994); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of 
Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in 
Conflicting Values, 43 Emory L.J. 1189 (1994); Laura L. Coon, Employment 
Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the 
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 
54 Vand. L. Rev. 481 (2001); Gayle A. Grissum, Church Employment and the 
First Amendment: The Protected Employer and the Vulnerable Employee, 51 
Mo. L. Rev. 911 (1986); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious 
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391 
(1987); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The 
Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1049 (1996).
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the plaintiff did not adhere to the organization’s religious 
standards.  Courts have ruled discrimination claims nonjusticiable 
whenever religious employers raise such a defense.108  As one 
court held, “Once the church states that the decision was, even in 
part, doctrinal, then the court would either have to invoke the First 
Amendment and cease inquiry or enter into the impermissible 
activity of analyzing church doctrine and perhaps weighing the 
importance of a particular area of the doctrine.”109
6. Cases involving statutory construction.  — The prohibition 
on judicial resolution of religious questions has led courts to 
construe statutes not to require prohibited judicial inquiries into 
religion and to invalidate statutes that require such inquiry.  For 
instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited employers from requiring 
an employee to take action that violated his or her religious creed. 
In the case that reached the Massachusetts high court, Catholic 
employees objected to working on Christmas and brought suit 
under the statute.110 The employer defended on the ground that 
Catholicism does not require adherents to refrain from work on 
Christmas. The Massachusetts court held that the dispute was not 
justiciable because it would have called on a court to determine 
what practices are required by Catholicism.111
108 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. l 996); see also, e.g. Himaka v. Buddhist 
Churches, 917 F. Supp 698 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing Title VII claim against 
religious group because it would require examination of religious question); 
Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing state 
employment discrimination action).
109 Id. at 1129.
110 Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 1996). 
111 Similarly, a conflict in the courts arose over the scope of permissible 
judicial inquiry into religious questions under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), enacted by Congress to overturn Smith, which 
prohibits the government from taking actions that “substantially burden” the 
exercise of religion unless the actions further a compelling state interest that 
cannot be achieved by a less restrictive means.  42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b).  Some 
courts have held that government action can be said to impose a substantial 
burden on the plaintiff’s exercise of religion only when the religious practice at 
issue is “mandated” by the claimant’s religion and is “central” to that religion.  
See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Other courts 
criticized that approach, holding that such judicially inquiry is barred by the 
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II.  AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF 
RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS IS NEITHER ADVISABLE NOR POSSIBLE
Before turning to an exploration of the two rationales that 
have been offered to support a prohibition on judicial examination 
of religious questions, this Part shows that a prohibition on judicial 
inquiry and resolution of religious questions cannot feasibly be 
applied in an absolute manner.  In a variety of contexts, courts 
routinely resolve factual questions about the content and validity of 
religious doctrines and practices.  Courts make extensive 
determinations about religious doctrines and practices in 
determining whether they qualify as “religious” under the 
Constitution and various statutes protecting and accommodating 
religion.  Courts also make determinations about the content of 
religion in assessing a wide range of religious programs provided 
by the government, such as those offered in prisons and in the 
military.  Furthermore, because there is no recognized test for 
distinguishing secular from religious questions, courts frequently 
address questions presented in secular terms in a manner that 
implicitly adopts a governmental position on the validity of 
religious doctrines and beliefs.  
As these examples demonstrate, it is not possible to 
understand the prohibition on judicial assessment of religious 
questions to be absolute.  Courts cannot plausibly adopt the 
position characterized by Michael McConnell as “religion 
blindness,” in which they would take no account of religious 
Constitution, and instead adopted the conclusion that any religiously-motivated 
action is protected by RFRA.  See, e.g., Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179
(7th Cir. 1996); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wisc. 1996); 
see generally Seeger, supra note 20.  In 2000, Congress resolved the issue by 
amending RFRA to provide that it protects “any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-5(7)(A).  Some commentators have nonetheless argued that RFRA is 
unconstitutional even as applied to the federal government because it requires 
prohibited inquiry into religion.  See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme 
Court at Its Word: the Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 
Mont. L. Rev. 5 (1995); but see Magarian, supra note 20 at 1945-1962.
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practices and beliefs.112  Instead, the question properly to be 
addressed is which religious questions courts can competently 
resolve without violating the Religion Clauses.
A. Courts Examine Religious Practices and Doctrines in 
Determining Whether a Practice or Doctrine Is “Religious”
Notwithstanding the apparent prohibition on judicial 
examination of religious questions, courts routinely undertake 
factual inquiry into religious practices and doctrines in determining 
whether a set of beliefs and practices amounts to a “religion.”   
Although no agreed meaning of the term “religion” has emerged 
under the First Amendment, a problem that has long vexed courts 
and commentators,113 courts must nonetheless decide what 
constitutes a religion in construing the state and federal tax codes, 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise 
Clause, state constitutions, and hundreds (if not thousands) of 
112 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a 
Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 689-691 (1992) (arguing 
that the Religion Clauses require accommodation of religion, not formal 
neutrality).  Dissenting in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696, 735 (1976), Justice Rehnquist recognized that a prohibition on judicial 
resolution of religious disputes cannot be applied absolutely: “[W]hile there may 
be a number of good arguments that civil courts . . . should, as a matter of the 
wisest use of their authority, avoid adjudicating religious disputes to the 
maximum extent possible, they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications.”  
See also Levine, supra note 19.
113 The closest the Court has come to adopting a test for determining what 
constitutes a religion was in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 165, 176 (1965), 
in which the Court employed two tests for determining religiosity in determining 
conscientious objector status under the military draft law: a substantive test, 
asking whether a belief is “based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to 
which all else is ultimately dependent”; and a functional test, which asks 
whether a belief system “occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to 
that filled by the God of those [religions] admittedly qualifying for the 
exemption.” For a sampling of the large volume of academic commentary 
addressing, proposing, and rejecting various tests and definitions of religion, see
Jesse Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
579; George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional 
Definition of “Religion,” 71 Georgetown L. Rev. 1519 (1983). 
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statutes that give special treatment to religious bodies and religious 
practices.114  Although determining what constitutes a religion 
“may present a most delicate question,” such determinations are 
necessary because, as the Court has declared, “[a] way of life, 
however virtuous and admirable” is not entitled to protection under 
the Religion Clauses “if it is based on purely secular 
considerations.”115
Determining what constitutes a religion frequently requires 
extensive factual examination of the content and scope of religious 
doctrines and practices.  Taking one example, in United States v. 
Meyers, a defendant charged with marijuana possession claimed 
that the prosecution violated his rights under RFRA because he 
was a minister in the “Church of Marijuana.”116  In deciding 
whether the Church of Marijuana was a bona fide religion and 
therefore entitled to protection under RFRA, the court canvassed 
caselaw on the meaning of the term “religion” and catalogued a set 
of factors that courts have employed: (1) whether the purported 
religion addresses “ultimate ideas” such as humanity’s purpose or 
place in the universe; (2) whether the purported religion includes 
“metaphysical beliefs,” which “address a reality which transcends 
the physical and immediately apparent world”; (3) whether the 
purported religion prescribes a moral or ethical system; (4) 
whether the purported beliefs are “comprehensive,” in that they 
seek “to provide the believer with answers to many, if not most of 
the problems and concerns that confront humans”; and (5) whether 
114 See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407, 1445 (1992) 
(concluding that the terms “religion” or “religious” appear over 14,000 times in 
state and federal statutes, and religious exemptions appear in over 2,000 
statutes); 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (providing that a person need not pay social 
security taxes if he can show that “he is a member of a recognized religious sect 
or division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such 
sect or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance 
of the benefits of any private or public insurance”); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(1) 
(protecting Native Americans from prosecutions for peyote use if they can show 
that they used peyote for “bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion”). 
115 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
116 906 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Wyo. 1995).
IS THERE A “RELIGIOUS QUESTION” DOCTRINE?               37
the purported religion includes any of the “accoutrements of 
religion,” such as a founding prophet, sacred writings, sacred sites, 
clergy, ceremonies, and holidays.117  The court then proceeded to 
examine the beliefs and practices of the Church of Marijuana in 
considerable depth, concluding that it was not a religion.  Dozens 
of similar cases can readily be found, in which a statutory or 
constitutional right depends on judicial factfinding regarding the 
content of a claimant’s religion.118
As several commentators have noted, the Constitution cannot 
plausibly be construed simultaneously to require protection for 
religion while forbidding courts from making assessments of 
whether a doctrine or practice is religious.  Gregory Magarian has 
stated: “Forbidding such judgments out of concern about judicial 
encroachment on religion would amount to killing free exercise 
protection with kindness.  By the same token, if courts could not 
discern which practices are ‘religious,’ then they could not credibly 
assess governmental actions under the Establishment Clause.”119
Factual inquiry into the meaning and content of religious doctrines 
and practices thus cannot plausibly be prohibited as long as courts 
117 Id.  at 1502-1503. 
118 See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
prison policy affording prisoners a right to possess religious protected inmate’s
right to books published by the Nation of Islam, relying on expert testimony that 
the books were of “crucial religious significance” and contained the essential 
teachings of the Nation of Islam, without which adherents would not understand 
how to pray); McBride v. Shawnee County, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Kan. 1999) 
(holding that Rastafarians were not entitled to smoke marijuana in prison 
because, unlike the use of peyote by certain Indian tribes, Rastafarian religion 
called for marijuana use whenever the mood strikes and not in scheduled 
ceremonies); Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Fla. 2003) 
(examining role of prayer pipe, smudging, drums, and headbands in plaintiff’s 
religion in determining free exercise claim).
119 Magarian, supra note 20, at 1960; see also Daniel O. Conkle, The Path 
of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal 
Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 Ind. L. J. 1, 32 (2000)  (arguing that the 
Court “cannot entirely escape the definitional problem—that is, as long as the 
Court finds any content in the religion clauses”); cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (“It cannot be ignored that the First 
Amendment itself contains a religious classification.”).
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are called upon to construe and apply the Religion Clauses and 
myriads of statutes giving special treatment to religion. 
B. Courts Examine Religious Questions in Assessing the 
Government’s Provision of Religious Programs
The government itself provides religious services in restrictive 
settings, such as prisons and the military, and in these settings the 
Establishment Clause has been understood to allow (if not require) 
the government to hire chaplains, serve religiously-sanctioned 
food, exempt religious practitioners from otherwise applicable 
rules, and generally make available religious programs to a wide 
variety of religious practitioners.120 In providing for the religious 
needs of military personnel and prison inmates, the government 
must determine what programs are needed by different religious 
communities and determine whether the programs it offers adhere 
to religious standards. For instance, where a prison offers a 
Passover seder for Jewish inmates, prison officials have been 
called on to determine whether a prisoner actually is Jewish and 
therefore entitled to attend, a quintessentially religious 
determination.121 In administering chaplaincy programs and in 
providing religiously sanctioned food, the government must 
determine whether the food it serves and the chaplains it hires 
adhere to religious law. The government could not effectively 
provide religious services to inmates and military personnel 
without extensive inquiry into the content of religious doctrines. 
120 See generally Julie B. Kaplan, Note, Military Mirrors on the Wall: 
Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 Yale L.J. 1210 (1986); Jamie 
Aron Forman, Note, Jewish Prisoners and Their First Amendment Right to a 
Kosher Meal: An Examination of the Relationship Between Prison Dietary 
Policy and Correctional Goals, 65 Brooklyn L. Rev. 477 (1999); Abraham 
Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food, 
Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 241 (1994). 
121 Kent Greenawalt, supra note 89 at 462.  
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C. The Difficulties Distinguishing Religious from Secular 
Question Make an Absolute Prohibition on Examining 
Religious Questions Impossible
If there is to be a religious question doctrine, there must be 
some sort of standard for determining which questions are 
religious and therefore out of judicial bounds.  Baker v. Carr
identifies six criteria for identifying nonjusticiable political 
questions, and cases and commentary have elaborated various 
formulations for each criteria.122  Not so with regard to religious 
questions. Although courts routinely dismiss cases on the ground 
that they would require examination of religious questions, one 
searches in vain through the cases and the academic literature for 
any test to distinguish religious from secular questions or even any 
discussion of the need for such a test.  Instead, courts and 
commentators distinguish the questions that may be judicially 
resolved from the prohibited category of religious questions 
without any identifiable analysis.  
The absence of any test for determining what questions are 
religious derives only in part from the absence of an agreed 
meaning of the term “religion.” Even where it is clear that a case 
involves religion, it is not always clear that case raises any 
religious questions.  A case about the tax status of a church may 
involve various questions touching on religion, such as the criteria 
for church membership, the fundraising activities of the church, 
and whether the church is properly characterized as a religious 
entity, but not all questions involving religion are understood to be 
“religious questions” that courts are barred from addressing.  If all 
questions touching on religion were off-limits to judicial inquiry, 
religious entities and religious actions would be absolutely immune 
from judicial consideration.  Just as the political question doctrine 
does not bar a court from considering actions described as 
122 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent 
History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643 (1989) 
(describing various formulations of the political question doctrine). 
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“political,” so a religious question doctrine cannot bar all 
consideration of religious practices and beliefs.123
Given the undefined nature of the category of religious 
questions said to be off-limits to judicial scrutiny, it is not 
surprising that the same types of questions may be perceived as 
religious in some contexts but secular in others. For instance, 
Ballard holds that it would be unconstitutional for courts to 
determine the truth or falsity of the claim that a person possesses 
supernatural powers or communicates with the spirit of a deceased 
saint, yet criminal defendants may be found insane or incompetent 
to stand trial because they believe that they possess supernatural 
powers or that they, or their victims, were possessed by demons.124
When offered as evidence of insanity, belief in spirit possession 
has been unhesitatingly deemed to be “delusional” or part of a 
“false belief system.”125  Rather than declaring nonjusticiable the 
validity of claims of demon possession, courts rely on such claims 
to establish that the defendant is suffering from mental illness and 
should be committed to a mental institution.  In other contexts, 
courts have generally upheld government regulation of fortune 
123 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 (“The doctrine of which we treat is 
one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The courts cannot reject 
as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 
‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”).
124 See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Brown, 449 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ohio. 1983) 
(declaring defendant to be insane because, at the time he killed his father, he 
believed himself to be in touch with guardian angels and the devil); Stevens v. 
State of Georgia, 350 S.E.2d 21 (Ga. 1986) (declaring defendant to be 
“delusional” and acting under a “delusional compulsion” because he beat his 
wife to death based on the belief that she was possessed by Satan and that, once 
beaten, she would rise again, rid of the devil); Archie v. State of Alabama, --
So.2d --, 2003 WL 559961 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2003) (declaring that 
defendant was mentally ill and suffering under a “false belief system” because 
she believed that God told her to kill her daughter, whom she believed was 
possessed by Satan). 
125 People v. Hernandez, 93 Cal. Rpt.2d 509, 517 (Cal. 2000) (defendant 
“delusional” for believing that he was the “white horseman who would pass 
judgment on everyone”); Mental Hygiene Legal Svcs. v. Wack, 551 N.Y.S.2d 
894, 895 n.1 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant committed to mental institution 
for disorder that caused him to kill his wife and son based on the belief that they 
were possessed by the devil).  
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telling, astrology, and communication with spirits, on the ground 
that such matters do not involve religion.126  Courts offer no 
analytical basis for distinguishing supernatural claims that are 
religious (and therefore exempt from judicial examination) from 
supernatural claims that are secular (and therefore subject to 
government regulation). The distinction has meant, however, that 
fraud claims may be pursued against astrologers, palm readers, and 
mediums, but not against preachers and cult leaders.127
Moreover, when questions touching on religious doctrines 
present themselves in what are understood to be secular contexts, 
courts routinely resolve them in a manner that effectively, albeit 
indirectly, amounts to a governmental declaration on the validity of
religious doctrines. This can be seen clearly in cases addressing the 
constitutionality of teaching about Darwinian evolution in the 
public schools.  The Establishment Clause is understood to permit 
the government to declare the theory of evolution to be true even 
though such a declaration effectively amounts to a declaration that 
some religious doctrines of creation are false.128  Questioning this 
126 See generally Gregory G. Sarno, supra note 39 (collecting cases); but 
see Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F.Supp. 1040 (E.D.Wis.1997) (holding 
that city’s attempt to ban public fortune telling violates First Amendment free 
speech clause); Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir.1998)
(holding that city’s interest in preventing fraud does not justify municipal 
ordinance against fortune telling); Spiritual Psychic Church v. City of Azusa, 
703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985) (holding that prohibition on fortune telling violates 
state free speech protection).
127 Compare N.Y.Penal Law § 165.35 (McKinney 1988) (prohibiting 
fortune telling for profit), with Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 179 Cal. App. 3d 450 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that claim could not proceed challenging the 
psychological techniques of the Unification Church because that would permit 
the jury to question the truth of the church’s religious doctrine). 
128 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (declaring 
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute mandating the teaching of “creation 
science” in public schools whenever the theory of evolution is taught).  Not only 
may the state teach evolution, it cannot prohibit its teaching. Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). As the Court held in Epperson v. Arkansas, the 
state cannot seek to prevent the teaching of evolution on the ground that it 
conflicts with the doctrine of the “divine creation of man.” 393 U.S. at 109. The 
Establishment Clause does not allow a state to “blot out a particular theory 
because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.” Id. at 
109. 
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result, Justice Black wondered whether governmental neutrality on 
religious matters might be better served by keeping the 
government from saying anything on subjects addressed by 
religion, such as the question of human origins:
If the theory [of evolution] is considered anti-
religious, as the Court indicates, how can the State 
be bound by the Federal Constitution to permit its 
teachers to advocate such an ‘anti-religious’ 
doctrine to schoolchildren? . . . .[Would] not the 
removal of the subject of evolution leave the State 
in a neutral position toward these supposedly 
competing religious and anti-religious 
doctrines?129
In Black’s view, constitutional difficulties arise not only when the 
government treats religious doctrines to be true but whenever the 
government advances secular theories that conflict with religious 
beliefs.  
Justice Black’s position has not prevailed, however, and for 
good reason: the government could hardly function if it were 
required to stay neutral on all subjects addressed by religious 
doctrines because such subjects know no limits.  Religions take 
varying positions on whether human life begins at conception or at 
birth, whether women should or should not work outside the home, 
and whether homosexual behavior is normal or is deserving of 
punishment, but the fact that religious doctrines address these 
subjects has never been understood to bar the Court from holding 
that, under the Constitution, human life begins at birth, that 
excluding women from military schools causes identifiable societal 
harms, and that criminalizing homosexual sodomy is irrational.130
Thus, notwithstanding Ballard’s rule against judging the truth or 
falsity of religious claims, courts effectively may issue 
governmental declarations that certain religious beliefs are false.  
Indeed, the courts would be paralyzed if they could not do so.
129 Id. at 113.
130 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003).
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As these examples show, it is not possible, or desirable, to 
prohibit courts from examining the content of religious doctrines.  
Courts do so routinely and could not, as a practical matter, avoid 
doing so.  
III. JUDICIAL FEAR OF THE NONRATIONAL: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETENCE OF COURTS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
As with the political question doctrine, the prohibition on 
judicial resolution of religious questions is based in large part on 
the concern that courts lack the institutional competence to resolve 
certain questions.  That was the view of James Madison;131 it 
formed the central ground for the Court’s 1872 decision in Watson 
v. Jones;132 and the Court has repeatedly articulated this rationale 
ever since.133  As it has recently been characterized by the Court, 
however, the prohibition against deciding religious questions is 
much broader than the political question doctrine, which prohibits 
courts from making political decisions but does not prohibit courts 
from determining what decisions have been made by the political 
branches. This Part seeks to demonstrate that, while the resolution 
of normative questions about religion (e.g., Is a religious belief 
true or valid? Is a religious practice effective?) may frequently lie 
131 Madison, supra note 15. 
132 13 U.S. (Wall.) at 729 (“It is not to be supposed that the judges of the 
civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all 
these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”).
133 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within 
the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or 
his fellow worker more correctly perceives the commands of their common 
faith.”); Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“What principle of law or logic can be brought 
to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his 
personal faith?”); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458 (requiring courts to decide whether 
litigants correctly interpret religious doctrines “would cast the Judiciary in a role 
that we were never intended to play”); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 
680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
particular beliers or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.”); Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 714 
n.8 (“Civil judges obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical 
tribunals in applying the ‘law’ that govern ecclesiastical disputes.”).
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beyond judicial competence, positive questions about religion 
(e.g., What does a religious tradition say on a particular subject? Is 
a religious practice considered an important or central one in the 
context of the religion?) do not exceed judicial competence, and 
such questions can be resolved using ordinary tools of judicial 
factfinding. 
A. Judicial Incompetence to Resolve Normative Religious 
Questions
Courts are said to lack competence to answer political 
questions because there are no “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for answering them.134 Courts cannot
determine whether to declare war, impose taxes, appoint officers, 
or sign treaties, because such questions call for “determination[s] 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”135  The same is true 
for normative questions about religion, as there are no standards 
for courts to apply in deciding whether a religious belief is valid or 
true, what religious practices should be followed, or how a 
religious body should be organized.  Such questions cannot 
ordinarily be resolved using the objective, rational, and empirical 
tools of law, and the Court has therefore been correct to conclude 
that courts lack competence to resolve such questions. 
Outside the context of religion, one is hard pressed to find a 
subject matter about which courts have declared themselves 
categorically incompetent to find facts. Judges and juries make 
determinations on complex and arcane questions of science, 
economics, and psychology, subjects for which they lack any 
training. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,136 the 
Court expressed great confidence in the abilities of judges and 
juries to resolve such esoteric questions.137  The difficulty of 
134 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
135 Id.
136 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
137 Daubert thus rejected the argument that abandonment of the “general 
acceptance” test for the admission of scientific evidence “will result in a ‘free-
for-all’ in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational 
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answering questions has provided no basis for declaring courts 
incompetent to do so.138
Given the courts’ profound confidence in their factfinding 
abilities, the recognition that some questions cannot be solved 
using the tools of law represents a rare expression of judicial 
humility.  In his dissenting opinion in Ballard, Justice Jackson 
articulated this point:
If religious liberty includes, as it must, the right to 
communicate [religious] experiences to others, it 
seems to me an impossible task for juries to 
separate fancied ones from real ones, dreams from 
happenings, and hallucinations from true 
clairvoyance. Such experiences, like some tones 
and colors, have existence for one but none at all 
for another. They cannot be verified to the minds 
of those whose field of consciousness does not 
include religious insight.139
In this view, religious questions lie beyond the competence of 
courts because they cannot be verified through reason and 
pseudoscientific assertions,” describing the argument as “overly pessimistic 
about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally.”  509 
U.S. at 595-596.
138 See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 623, 639-640 
(1943) (“We cannot because of modest estimates of our competence in 
[particular fields], withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the 
function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”); Cf.  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595, 613-614 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect churches and their members 
from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from having to decide 
difficult evidentiary questions.”).
139 322 U.S. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Serbian Orthodox 
Diocese v. Milvojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (“[I]t is the essence of 
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as 
matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria.”); 
see also P. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 26 (1964) (“Not only is 
religion by its nature not subject to a test of validity determined by rational 
thought and empiric knowledge, but a principal purpose underlying religious 
liberty is to remove the question of what is true religion from the domain of 
secular authority.”).  
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empirical evidence.140  Courts cannot answer religious questions 
on the terms used by religions because, as Bruce Ackerman has 
stated, the liberal state is “deprived of divine revelation,” and 
decisions cannot be made “on the basis of some conversation with 
the spirit world.”141
The institutional competence rationale for prohibiting judicial 
resolution of religious questions is thus based on a conception of 
legal and religious questions as requiring distinct 
epistemologies.142  Judicial tools available for answering factual 
and legal questions have long been understood to be limited 
exclusively to the rational, objective, and empirical.143 Courts may 
attempt to answer scientific questions even without scientific 
training because the tools of law are consonant with those of 
science.144  Judicial decisions that cannot be explained in rational 
140 Cf. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 (holding that the neutral-principles approach 
to resolving property disputes among religious factions “relies exclusively on 
objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers 
and judges.”).
141 Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 103, 127 (1980); see 
also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul 
L. Rev. 1, 24 (2000) (“‘Faith’ is distinguished from ‘reason,’ and ‘reason’ is said 
to be the hallmark of liberal governance.”).
142 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 141, at 24 (characterizing Madison’s 
statement that a civil magistrate is not a “competent judge of Religious Truth” to 
imply “an epistemic, as opposed to an institutional, basis for the special place of 
religion under liberal democracy”). 
143 See THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 268-269 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth 
Frost eds., 1986) (quoting Aristotle as stating “Law is reason free from 
passion.”); id. (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, as stating “Law is 
a regulation in accord with reason.”); Coke, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND (“Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing 
else but reason.”); Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of 
Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391, 411 (1963). (“The domain of government  . . 
. is that in which social problems are resolved by rational social processes, in 
which men can reason together, can examine problems and propose solutions 
capable of object proof or persuasion, subject to objective inquiry by courts and 
electors.”); Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 789, 
789 (1990) (arguing that the judicial method should be “entirely rationalistic”). 
144 See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil. 
515, 539 (1980) (stating that factual judgments must be based on “practices of 
common sense and science”); cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he word 
‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. 
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terms, in contrast, are not considered acceptable.  For this reason, 
Justice Stewart Potter’s famous dictum that defining pornography 
may be impossible yet “I know it when I see it,” received 
considerable derision, as it suggested that legal conclusions could 
be based on gut feeling or vision, unmediated by rational 
explanation.145  In contrast to ordinary questions of fact, religious 
questions cannot be answered by courts because they do not 
depend on the logic of law and instead may be answered on the 
basis of faith, mystical experiences, miracles, or other nonrational 
sources.146
The conception of law and religion as employing inherently 
distinct methodologies oversimplifies both law and religion. 147  As 
Larry Alexander points out, religious beliefs are frequently 
grounded on the same types of evidence and reasoning as secular 
beliefs.  For instance, a Christian believer in God and the miracles 
of the Bible may base her beliefs on the “number of witnesses, 
their independently tested reliability, and the number of intelligent 
people who accept these accounts as true.”148 Similar reasoning 
and evidence is often used to support secular beliefs for which one 
lacks first-hand observation, such as, in Professor Alexander’s 
examples, the “beliefs that Washington was the first president, that 
Kinshasha is the capital of Zaire, that Maris hit sixty-one home 
The term ‘applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred 
from such facts or accepted as truth on good grounds.”) (quoting WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)). 
145 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring).
146 Such is the view, for instance, of Joanne Brant, who construes Smith to 
be based on the proposition that “[r]eligion encompasses the mystic, spiritual 
aspects of human nature, while law answers to the less esoteric demands of logic 
and tradition.  By this reasoning, any attempt to measure the worth of a religious 
claim by the yardstick of rational argument and precedent is doomed to fail.”  
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for 
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 5, 20 (1995).
147 Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 
30 San Diego L. Rev. 763, 768 (1993).  As Professor Alexander points out, 
“Some of religion’s strongest supporters load the dice against religion by 
deeming it the realm of ‘faith’ as opposed to ‘reason.”  Id. at 770 n.20. 
148 Id. at 768. 
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runs, and that the speed of light is constant.”149  Conversely, legal 
analysis, like religious thinking, frequently involves certain 
nonrational elements.  As Paul Gewirz has argued, defending 
Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” dictum, law “includes 
knowledge that cannot always be explained, but that is no less 
valid for that.”150  Professor Gewirz points to such nonrational 
elements as imagination, courage, compassion, intuition, and 
eloquence.151  Other scholars, notably Kent Greenawalt, have 
argued that certain questions demanding governmental resolution, 
such as abortion rights and animal rights, cannot be resolved 
through reason alone and require resort to nonrational (or what he 
terms “religious”) modes of thinking.152
The conclusion that religion and law do not inherently resolve 
questions through distinct methodologies does not, however, mean 
that courts are institutionally competent to resolve normative 
religious questions, such as the validity of religious beliefs or the 
proper organization of religious bodies.  Religious freedom means 
that decisions about religion can be made on the basis of any 
methodology that seems appropriate to the individual or religious 
group.153  So, while an individual may base her religious beliefs 
and practices on the same types of logic and evidence available in
the courtroom, such questions need not be resolved in that way.  
Religion is not unique in this respect. As Professor McConnell has 
explained, there are numerous categories of secular questions that, 
like religious questions, are not susceptible to judicial resolution 
due to their uniquely private or idiosyncratic nature: Just as 
Madison proclaimed that civil magistrates are not competent to 
determine religious truths, “[t]here is no reason to suppose that the 
149 Id. at 769.
150 Paul Gewirz, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 Yale L.J. 1023, 1044 
(1996). 
151 Id. at 1033.
152 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law Making, 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 352 (1985); see also H. Putnam, Reason, TRUTH AND HISTORY 136 (1981) 
(“There is no neutral conception of rationality.”).
153 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 
714-715 (1976) (“[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical 
decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not 
rational or measurable by objective criteria.”).
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civil magistrate is a competent judge of artistic merit.”154
Similarly, “religion, like love, is a judgment most of us prefer to 
make for ourselves.”155  Thus, while there may be some normative 
religious questions that could be resolved through resort to 
ordinary judicial tools, the category is defined by its susceptibility 
to resolution by modes of thinking and types of evidence outside 
the ordinary range of judicial decisionmaking.  As a result, the 
courts have been correct to conclude that they lack institutional 
competence to resolve normative religious questions.
B. Judicial Competence to Determine Positive Religious 
Questions
In Smith, the Court reasoned that judicial resolution of positive 
questions about religion, such as whether a religious practice is 
considered central or important to practitioners of the religion, 
should be prohibited for the same reason that courts should not 
make normative judgments about religious beliefs: “Judging the 
centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious 
claims.”156  In a fundamental way, however, judicial examination 
of positive questions about religion is not akin to judicial 
examination of normative religious questions.  To describe is not 
to judge, and the determination of what beliefs people hold does 
not require a determination of whether those beliefs are correct.157
Judicial examination of the content of religious doctrine is more 
akin to judicial determinations of the content of foreign law: when 
a court determines what the law of England or Italy is, does not 
154 McConnell, supra note 141, at 25; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”) 
155 Id. at 27. 
156 494 U.S. at 887 (internal quotation omitted).
157 See McConnell, supra note 89, at 1144 (“In such cases, the court is not 
judging the ‘merits’ of religious claims but solely trying to determine what they 
are.”).
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judge the validity of those countries’ laws or endorses the policies 
behind those laws.  Courts are just as capable of determining what 
Judaism or Hinduism have to say as they are at determining what 
the laws of Israel or India are.  This can readily be seen in cases in 
which courts have determined the content of the law of theocratic 
states, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where religious law 
governs.158
The clearest demonstration of judicial competence to 
undertake factfinding about the content of religious doctrine and 
practices is, as discussed above, that courts routinely undertake 
extensive factfinding into the content of religious doctrines and 
practices in determining whether a practice or doctrine is
“religious” and therefore subject to the protections of the Religion 
Clauses and statutes addressing religion.  In undertaking such 
inquiry, courts routinely examine the content of a purported 
religion’s beliefs and practices, its ethical teachings, its ceremonies 
and holidays, and various accoutrements of religion.159  As 
Professor Magarian has concluded, it is only a difference of 
degree, not of kind, between the judicial factfinding necessary to 
determine whether a practice or doctrine is “religious” and the 
factfinding necessary to determine whether a practice or doctrine is 
considered important or central to the religion.160
To be sure, religious beliefs and practices are frequently based 
on faith or other nonrational sources, but determining what those 
beliefs and practices are, or whether they are considered important, 
does not require courts to employ anything other than ordinary 
factfinding techniques.  Courts competently can assess—that is, 
describe—the content of religious doctrines and practices without 
158 For instance, in Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 
1992), an Iranian citizen sought refugee status on the ground that as a convert to 
Christianity she faced a real threat of persecution in Iran.  Experts on Islamic 
law testified to help the court determine how sharia law would treat converts 
like the plaintiff. 
159 See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
160 Magarian, supra note 20 at 1960 (“The determinations about religious 
substance necessary for strict scrutiny of accommodation claims differ only in 
degree from the most basic judgments about what constitutes ‘religion’ within 
the meaning of the First Amendment.”).
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assessing their validity.161  Taking what is perhaps a nonreligious 
example, suppose that a palm reader agreed to provide a traditional 
palm reading, but a customer refuses to pay, claiming that the 
reading he received was unorthodox. There is no reason to believe 
that a court would be incompetent to resolve the palm reader’s 
breach of contract claim.  Each side could call experts to testify on 
the techniques of palm reading, describing what they consider to 
be traditional techniques. Treatises could be consulted. Certain 
basic points would become clear—that one line is known as the 
love line, another as the life line. Other aspects of palm reading 
might be considered more controversial within the palm reading 
community. Based on the evidence, and employing ordinary 
factfinding standards, a court could determine that certain practices 
are considered traditional among palm readers, while others are 
considered unorthodox. It could undertake such factfinding without 
any need to determine whether palm reading has any validity in 
describing personality traits, exposing the past, or predicting the 
future. That is, courts have the ability to discover the rules and 
doctrines understood to govern nonrational areas without making 
normative judgments about those rules and doctrines.  Indeed, 
courts have long been charged with discerning the positive law 
without judging its wisdom.162
Institutional competence thus justifies the reluctance of courts 
to determine the validity or truth of religious claims and doctrines, 
161 Legal principles, no less than religious beliefs, may be based on 
unverifiable premises, but that does not prevent courts from determining what 
those principles are or how they should be applied. The recognition that law, 
like religion, may be based on unverifiable premises formed the basis for a joke 
in Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Ballard, in which he characterized 
belief in “dispassionate judges” as a mystical and unverifiable matter akin to 
belief in Santa Claus: “All schools of religious thought make enormous 
assumptions, generally on the basis of revelations authenticated by some sign or 
miracle. . . . Religious symbolism is even used by some with the same mental 
reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter Bunnies 
or dispassionate judges. It is hard in matters so mystical to say how literally one 
is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches. . . .” Ballard, 322 U.S. at 94 
(emphasis added).
162 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual 
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected 
by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.”).
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but it cannot support a prohibition on judicial resolution of 
questions about the content of religious doctrines and practices. 
Courts have competence to apply the same processes of factfinding 
to determine the contours of religious doctrines, yet refuse to do so 
when a clergy person gets fired for failing to provide traditional 
services, a merchant sells food claimed to be kosher, or a parent 
fails to raise a child in an agreed religion. There may be good 
reasons for courts to refuse to resolve such questions, but a lack of 
competence is not one. 
IV. DOCTRINAL ENTANGLEMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY OF COURTS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
The prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions 
reflects not only a concern with the institutional competence of 
courts but also the constitutional competence of courts relative to 
religious authorities, that is, the conviction that the Religion 
Clauses leave the resolution of religious questions to religious 
authorities, free from governmental entanglement and 
interference.163 As the Supreme Court has said, “[T]he First 
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and 
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left 
free from the other within its respective sphere.”164  This Part 
163 In this way, too, the prohibition is akin to the political question 
doctrine, which rests upon the conviction that the Constitution leaves certain 
decisions to be made by the political branches, free from interference by the 
courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (the 
political question doctrine “is designed to restrain the Judiciary from 
inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of 
Government”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1959).  Just as the political question doctrine 
reflects a constitutional division of authority between the branches of 
government, the Religion Clauses express a division of authority between 
secular and religious bodies.
164 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); 
see also Michael McConnell, supra note 141 at 29 (the Religion Clauses divide 
power “between two jurisdictions: the earthly and the divine.”); Tribe, supra
note 14 at 1226 (stating that the Establishment Clause reflects the “concern that 
secular and religious authorities must not interfere with each other’s respective 
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examines the extent to which judicial resolution of religious 
questions interferes with the protected sphere of religion and 
thereby exceeds judicial authority.  First, it seeks to demonstrate 
that the Establishment Clause is best read to prohibit courts from 
judging the truth or validity of religious beliefs but not to prohibit 
judicial resolution of positive questions about religion.  Second, it 
argues that the conclusion that courts may answer positive 
questions about religion is unaffected by whether the question is a 
matter of dispute or controversy within a religious community.  
A. Prohibiting Judicial Resolution of Positive Questions About 
Religion Cannot Be Squared with Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence and Theory
It is easy to see why judicial resolution of normative religious 
questions intrudes into the sphere of religion protected from 
government meddling.  The Religion Clauses give each church 
body, indeed each individual, authority to decide for itself, herself, 
and himself what religious doctrines to follow, which rituals to 
consider valid and meaningful, and which practices to deem 
mandatory or optional.165  To declare a religious claim to be true or 
false, valid or invalid, would directly entangle the government in 
questions constitutionally assigned to the religious sphere.166
spheres of choice and influence”). As with the separation of political and 
judicial authority, the division of authority between government and religion can 
be understood in jurisdictional terms, under which the government would 
exceed its jurisdiction if it decided religious questions. See Esbeck, supra note 
14, at 10-11; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733 (stating that questions 
of religious doctrine are “matters over which the civil courts exercise no 
jurisdiction”); O’Brien & O’Brien, supra note 22 at 85 (arguing that church and 
state are separate sovereigns, each of which can act independently and 
exclusively within its sphere).  
165 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”).
166 In Justice O’Connor’s formulation, the government would likewise be 
seen as violating the Establishment Clause if it “endorses or disapproves” a 
religious message, as the courts undoubtedly would do if they were to assess the 
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On the other hand, judicial resolution of positive questions 
about religion does not interfere with the authority of religious 
bodies or individuals to decide what beliefs to hold, what doctrines 
to follow, and what practices to observe.  The government plainly 
cannot tell the Catholic Church who should be Pope, but it would 
be hard to discern unconstitutional meddling with the church for a 
court to say who the Pope is. The government would 
unconstitutionally entangle itself in religious matters if it allowed a 
jury to determine whether Guy Ballard actually possessed 
supernatural healing powers because it would interfere with the 
right of believers to decide that question freely, but there would be 
no interference with religion for the government to declare that 
Ballard’s followers believed him to have had such powers.  
Likewise, it would not interfere with religion for a court to declare 
that Orthodox Jews believe that the Torah prohibits them from 
eating pork, that Christians believe in the divinity of Jesus, that 
Cheyenne religion considers Devil’s Tower to be a sacred site, and 
that Buddhists disclaim the existence of the self.  Positive 
declarations about religion pose little or no threat of interference 
with religion because religious bodies and individuals remain 
entirely free to decide for themselves what to do and what to 
believe, and they remain free even if the government 
mischaracterizes their beliefs and practices.167
A constitutional distinction between the government’s power 
to make normative and positive declarations on matters of religion 
has long been understood to apply in public schools. On the one 
hand, public schools violate the Establishment Clause when they 
require the recitation of prayers or daily Bible readings because 
such requirements are understood to be tantamount to a 
governmental embrace of the truth and validity of a religious 
message.168  In contrast, the Establishment Clause allows public 
schools to offer comparative religion classes, in which students 
validity of religious claims.  See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
167 See Laycock, supra note 89.
168 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (Ten Commandments);
School District of Abington Twnp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (Bible 
reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer).
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study the Bible, prayers, or other religious texts, so long as the 
religious material is “presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education.”169  It has thus been recognized that, in 
schools, the government may make positive but not normative 
declarations about religious matters. There is no reason why the 
Establishment Clause should apply differently in courts than in 
public schools, prohibiting judges from making positive 
declarations about religion that would be acceptable if made by 
teachers.170
Not only the public schools, Congress and the Executive 
Branch more generally are authorized to make positive 
assessments about the content of religious beliefs and practices.  
169 School District of Abington Twnp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 
(1963); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (the Bible may 
constitutionally be studied “in an appropriate study of history, civilization, 
ethics, comparative religion, or the like”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 
607 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Courses in comparative religion of course 
are customary and constitutionally appropriate.”); cf. Locke v. Davey, 124 S.Ct. 
1307 (2004) (holding that the state does not violate the Free Exercise Clause by 
prohibiting state funds from being used to pursue degrees in divinity: “Training 
someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor. Indeed, 
majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an 
academic pursuit.”); see generally Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in 
the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & Pol. 329 (2002); Leslie Griffith, “We Do Not 
Preach. We Teach.”  Religion Professors and the First Amendment, 19 Quinn. 
L. Rev. 1 (2000).
170 It may be tempting to say that declarations by judges about religion are 
constitutionally different from the same statements made by teachers because 
the resolution of cases may depend on such declarations.  Unlike a professor’s 
resolution of religious questions, judicial resolution of religious questions, if 
allowed, would form the basis of government action.  Litigants could win or lose 
their jobs, monetary damages, or custody of their children, based on a court’s 
understanding or misunderstanding of their religions.  Cf. Robert Cover, 
Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS 
OF ROBERT COVER 203-238 (1995) (Minow, Ryan, and Sarat eds.) (arguing that 
the fundamental difference between legal and literary interpretation is that the 
former provides justification for the state’s use and threat of force). Yet the 
cases adopting and applying the broad prohibition on judicial resolution of 
religious questions make clear that the purely iterative act of resolving religious 
questions is itself understood to be prohibited by the Constitution, without 
regard to the effects of such iterations on the litigants.  See supra notes 51-66, 
84-89 and accompanying text.  
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The political branches are understood to have authority to establish 
exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious conduct, 
and they may do so based on examination and assessment of 
religious practices and beliefs.171  For instance, when Congress 
decided to exempt Native Americans from state and federal laws 
criminalizing the use of peyote, it issued legislative findings 
regarding the content of Native American religion: “The Congress 
finds and declares that . . . for many Indian people, the traditional 
ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has 
for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in 
perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures.”172  If the political 
branches could not make such positive declarations regarding the 
content of religious practices and beliefs, the government could 
never act to accommodate religion. To prohibit the courts from 
making the same sorts of declarations would create the anomaly 
that the Religion Clauses apply more strenuously to the courts than 
the political branches.
In addition, while judicial resolution of positive questions 
about religion has been characterized as creating excessive 
“entanglement” between government and religion,173 that 
conclusion cannot be squared with the development of 
“entanglement” as an Establishment Clause test.174  The 
171 See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (“[I]t is a 
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference 
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions.”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[G]overnment [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, 
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals 
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed.”); 
see generally McConnell, supra note 112; but see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing 
the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of 
Religion, 140 Penn. L. Rev. 55, 580-587 (1991).
172 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a).  
173 See Tribe, supra note 14.
174 The current status of “entanglement” as an Establishment Clause test is 
uncertain. Under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, government action was said to be consistent with the Establishment 
Clause when (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal effect does not 
advance or inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster “an excessive entanglement 
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prohibition on governmental entanglement with religion has never 
been understood to embody an absolute prohibition of interaction 
between government and religion but instead reflects in some 
measure the inevitability of such interaction, as only “excessive” 
entanglement with religion is understood to violate the 
Establishment Clause.175  The caselaw gives imprecise guidance on 
exactly what government interaction with religion is considered 
excessive,176 but a rough standard of what the Court has considered 
to be excessive may be gleaned from the primary area in which the 
Court has employed excessive entanglement as a standard: the 
recurring problem of government monitoring of the religious 
content of programs receiving public funds.  When public funds 
are provided to religious entities, governmental bodies frequently 
seek assurance that the money is being used for secular purposes 
and not to advance religion.177 The Court has held that no 
with religion.”  403 U.S. at 612-613.  Since then, however, the Court has called 
into question whether excessive entanglement should be regarded as a separate 
test or an aspect of the effects test.  See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 
(1997).  The status of the Lemon test itself is in doubt, with a majority of 
Justices apparently adopting Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test.  See 
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the 
Establishment Clause is violated whenever the government “endorses or 
disapproves of religion”); see generally Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The 
Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 8 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
323 (1995). 
175 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (“Not all entanglements, of course, have the 
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is 
inevitable . . ., and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between 
the two. Entanglement must be ‘excessive’ before it runs afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.”); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (“[T]otal separation is not 
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and 
religious organizations is inevitable.”); see also Roemer v. Maryland Public 
Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 745-746 (1976) (“A system of government that makes 
itself felt as pervasively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths 
with the church. . . . “[A] hermetic separation of the two is an impossibility and 
has never been required.”).
176 See Laycock, supra note 65 at 1392 (“Sometimes [entanglement] seems 
to mean contact, or the opposite of separation; it has also been used 
interchangeably with ‘involvement’ and ‘relationship.’ Sometimes it seems to 
mean anything that might violate the religion clauses.”).
177 Because the government must maintain a “course of neutrality . . . 
between religion and non-religion,” Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 
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excessive entanglement arises when the government monitors the 
content of a religious organization’s services, as long as such 
monitoring is not “pervasive” and does not involve continuous 
government “surveillance” of religious entities.178 Under these 
cases, no excessive entanglement with religion occurs from 
unannounced monthly visits by government officials to assess 
whether a religious entity is using public funds to promote 
U.S. 373, 382 (1985), the government cannot deny funding to an organization 
solely because it is religious when it provides public funding for other 
organizations doing similar work. Compare Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 
(1988) (upholding federal funding of agencies, including religious entities, to 
provide services addressing teenage sexual problems); Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746 
(upholding state statute providing subsidies to qualified colleges, including 
religiously affiliated institutions, stating that “religious institutions need not be 
quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all”); Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S 1 (1947) (approving busing services available to 
both public and private school children), with Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that, where the 
government generally allows private groups to use public school rooms to be 
used by private groups after school hours it cannot deny the use of such rooms 
to religious organizations). 
178 For instance, in Lemon, the Court examined Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania programs that reimbursed private schools for the costs of 
providing secular courses also offered in public schools. The Court found that 
the programs involved excessive entanglement with religion because the 
programs required “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance” of the content of the courses taught by the private school teachers 
in order to ensure that the courses were limited to strictly secular subjects and 
did not inculcate religion. 403 U.S. at 619.  In contrast, in Tilton v. Richardson, 
the Court upheld a federal program that provided construction grants to colleges 
and universities, including religiously-affiliated institutions, but which specified 
that the funds could not be used to construct buildings used for religious 
instruction, training, or worship. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).  The Court found that the 
program did not foster excessive entanglement because it involved only minimal 
government monitoring to ensure that buildings constructed with public funds 
were used for secular purposes.  Id. at  687 (“Such inspection as may be 
necessary to ascertain that the facilities are devoted to secular education is 
minimal.”). In one of its most recent pronouncements, the Court held that no 
excessive entanglement resulted from a government program involving 
intermittent monitoring of whether public funding of remedial school teachers 
was being used for religious indoctrination. Agostini, 521 U.S at 232-233. In 
short, excessive entanglement will only be found where there is “pervasive 
monitoring by public authorities” of the religious content of programs provided 
by religious organizations.  Id at 233.
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religious or secular content,179 or when religious entities are 
required to prove the absence of religious content in its publicly 
funded programming.180  As these cases established, the 
government does not interfere with religion whenever it examines 
the content of services provided by religious bodies.  No principle 
of entanglement that can be gleaned from the cases supports the 
conclusion that judicial examination of the content of religious 
doctrine should be considered any more intrusive, or so inherently 
intrusive as to bar courts from asking examining religious content 
in every case, such as asking the parties to a contract to explain the 
meaning of a religious term appearing in the contract, from asking 
a merchant who labeled food to be kosher to explain the use of that 
term, or from inquiring whether a church employee was fired on 
the basis of sex or on the basis of religious standards.  In this 
context, “entanglement” represents simply a label for the anxiety 
created by government involvement in matters touching on 
religion.181  It does not identify a principle for prohibiting judicial 
factfinding regarding religious matters.
B. Courts May Resolve Disputed Religious Questions Unless 
Doing So Would Involve Normative Judgments on the 
Correctness of Religious Views
Passages in several of the Supreme Court’s opinions suggest 
that the prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions 
applies most forcefully when courts are called upon to resolve 
controversies or disputes over religious doctrines.  For instance, in 
Thomas v. Review Board, two witnesses disagreed over whether 
179 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-233.
180 See, e.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. at 680 (finding no excessive entanglement 
where religious institutions receiving public funding “presented evidence that 
there had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed 
facilities, that there are no religious symbols or plaques in or on them, and that 
they had been used solely for nonreligious purposes.”).
181 Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party 
Harms, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 589 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence under the Religion Clauses is guided by two anxieties, an “anxiety 
of entanglement” and an “anxiety of anarchy”). 
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the doctrines of the Jehovah’s Witnesses are consistent with 
performing work for the military, but the Court ruled that it was 
beyond judicial authority “to inquire whether the petitioner or his 
fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their 
common faith.”182  For the reasons discussed above, it would 
violate the Establishment Clause principle of neutrality for a court 
to decide that one side in a religious dispute takes the normatively 
correct position.  A court therefore could not constitutionally 
resolve the disputed question of whether performing military work 
is sinful.  But the Constitution should not be read to prohibit a 
court from determining what beliefs are actually held by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, a question that can be addressed without determining 
whether those views are correct.  
In order to address the free exercise question in Thomas, it 
was unnecessary to determine what doctrines are held by the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses because the right to free exercise of religion 
guaranteed by the First Amendment is an individual right, which 
does not depend on whether an individual’s religious beliefs 
accord with the other members of his religion.183  But in other 
cases the parties’ rights may well depend on an assessment of the 
religious beliefs of an organized religious body.  Suppose that a 
contract requires a minister to abide by the standards of her church, 
but she is fired by the church board for presiding at a gay wedding, 
in violation of the official doctrines of the church.  The minister or 
the board should be able to point to the official positions of the 
church in challenging or defending the employment decision.  A 
court may determine whether the minister’s action violated the 
church’s standards without in any way deciding whether those 
182 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (stating that 
courts may not interpret religious doctrines if doing so “would require the civil 
court to resolve a religious controversy”); Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709 (“[T]his 
case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious 
dispute.”); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (“But First Amendment values 
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the 
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”).
183 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 466 (“For most kinds of cases, 
there are powerful reasons to adopt an individual’s perspective, not the group’s.  
It is the individual who is seeking to engage in behavior; his or her convictions 
should matter the most.”).
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standards are correct.  That the church and the fired minister may 
disagree over whether those standards are correct does not change 
the nature of the court’s positive inquiry, nor does it drag the court 
into undertaking a normative inquiry into which side correctly 
perceives the faith.
In some cases, the answer to disputed positive questions about 
the content of religious beliefs may be indeterminate and thus 
insufficient to resolve the religious issues presented by a case.  For 
instance, in Zummo v. Zummo, discussed above, although 
divorcing parents had agreed not to take their children “to religious 
services contrary to the Jewish faith,” the noncustodial parent took 
her children to Catholic services.184  The religious question 
presented by Zummo—does “the Jewish faith” allow Jews to attend 
non-Jewish religious services?—is a positive question, in that it 
can be answered by describing Jewish beliefs without taking a 
position on whether or not those beliefs are correct.  The purely 
descriptive answer to that question, however, is indeterminate, in 
that some strains of Orthodox Judaism construe Jewish laws and 
traditions to prohibit Jews from attending services in a Christian 
church, while Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative 
Judaism take a contrary position.185  A court could describe those 
differing beliefs but constitutionally could say nothing more.  
Other than saying that there are disagreements among the sects, a 
court could determine that “the Jewish faith” allows or forbids 
Jews to attend Christian services only by crossing the line into 
resolving the normative question of which Jewish sect is correct.  
To answer that question would be tantamount to a judicial 
endorsement of the doctrinal position of one sect at the expense of 
others.  As a result, the court could determine whether the 
noncustodial parent violated the divorce agreement only if it could 
determine that the Zummos had in mind a particular Jewish 
denomination in setting out the terms of their agreement.  
Disputes within a religious community highlight the 
difficulties that may arise in distinguishing positive from 
184 Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1142.
185 See Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Confrontation, 6 Tradition: A Journal of 
Orthodox Thought (1964).
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normative questions about religion.  The application of the kosher 
food laws presents a good case in point.186  It is possible to 
understand the question of whether food is properly labeled to be 
kosher in either normative or positive terms.  One could view the 
question in normative terms as addressing the truth of the religious 
claim that the food complies with the laws established by God for 
the Jewish people.  That appears to be the conclusion of courts that 
have held such statutes unconstitutional.187  Defenders of kosher 
food laws have seen the question in positive terms, as addressing 
whether food is “kosher” in the common meaning of that term, 
without in any way addressing whether Jewish dietary laws have 
any legitimacy.188  As this Article has argued, a court may not 
determine whether food actually is ritually fit for consumption 
according to God’s laws any more than it may determine whether 
Devil’s Tower actually is a sacred site, but a court may 
constitutionally determine whether Jews believe the food to be 
kosher just as it could determine whether the Cheyenne people 
consider Devil’s Tower to be sacred.  
The distinction between a court’s authority to resolve positive 
and normative religious questions, while sometimes quite slippery, 
becomes especially significant when there are disputes within a 
religious community.  For instance, Orthodox Judaism generally 
considers swordfish to be unkosher, while Conservative Judaism 
considers it to be kosher.189  A court constitutionally may answer 
only the positive question—would swordfish be understood within 
the Jewish community to be kosher?—the answer to which is 
indeterminate.  For a court to determine whether swordfish 
186 See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. 
187 See, e.g., Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1263 (concluding that 
kosher law is unconstitutional regardless of whether there is any religious 
dispute over what food is kosher: “The laws of kashrut are intrinsically 
religious, whether they are ambiguous or not and whether they are disputed or 
not. Religious doctrines cannot be recast as secular principles simply because 
they are clear. . . .  Nor do religious doctrines become neutral simply because 
they are widely or even universally held.”).
188 See supra note 104.
189 See Yacov Lipschutz, KASHRUTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BACKGROUND 
AND REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF KASHRUTH 158-160 (1988); 6 
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 27.
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actually is kosher would require the court to determine which set 
of rabbis are correct in their religious position, a determination that 
entails a normative judgment on which religious denomination 
correctly perceives God’s commands.190
While the answer to disputed questions over the scope or 
content of religious beliefs may sometimes be indeterminate, the 
existence of such a dispute should present no bar to judicial 
examination.  Litigants may readily gin factual disputes over 
religious beliefs and practices, making the existence of religious 
controversies too easily manipulable to function as a threshold 
inquiry.  Moreover, if the existence of disputes over religious 
beliefs and practices were a threshold question, it would only push 
the resolution of religious questions up a level of generality, as 
courts would still be required to assess whether there could be any 
plausible controversy over the religious issue, a question that itself 
would call for examination of religious matters.  In any event, as 
with judicial examination of non-controversial aspects of religious 
practices and beliefs, courts cannot feasibly avoid examining 
190 Although he does not employ the positive-normative distinction 
advanced in this Article, it would appear that this distinction underlies the 
position presented by Kent Greenawalt in discussing the constitutionality of 
kosher food regulation.  See Greenawalt, supra note 19.  Professor Greenawalt 
argues that courts may not adopt an Orthodox definition of “kosher” where there 
are disputes between the Orthodox and Conservative communities over whether 
food is kosher: “Such unequal treatment should be regarded as a denominational 
preference . . . [which] unjustifiably promotes Orthodox Judaism at the expense 
of Conservatism.”  Id. at 810.  In contrast, Professor Greenawalt asserts that a 
court could uphold a fine imposed against a merchant with an idiosyncratic 
definition of what food is kosher—in Professor Greenawalt’s example, someone 
who claims that any food prepared in the right spiritual environment should be 
considered kosher, even pork, which Jewish traditions have long emphatically 
considered unkosher.  In such a case, Greenawalt concludes that a court could 
undertake a positive inquiry into deciding whether the use of the term “kosher” 
comports with a common understanding of the term to mean “acceptable 
according to traditional Jewish standards.”  Id. at 793.  In Greenawalt’s view, a 
court assessing that positive question would not be understood to endorse those 
standards: “It does not say people should follow kosher requirements; it merely 
assists those who have this belief in fulfilling it.” Id. at 792.  The latter 
hypothetical is troubling, however, in that it suggests an idiosyncratic or 
minority religious position would receive less protection than more established 
beliefs.
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matters of religion over which disputes within a sect exist.  In 
County of Allegheny, for example, the Court had to assess the 
religious significance of a Hanukkah menorah in deciding whether 
a public display violated the Establishment Clause.  On this point 
there was conflicting evidence in the record, some testimony 
suggesting that the menorah had become primarily a secular object, 
other evidence suggesting its continued religiosity.191
Conceivably, a description of the religious significance of the 
menorah could be understood to endorse one religious view at the 
expense of another.  But if courts could not resolve disputes over 
the religiosity of an object or practice, they could not plausibly 
know what practices and beliefs are protected by the Religion 
Clauses.192
CONCLUSION
The broad prohibition against judicial resolution of all 
religious questions, positive or normative, is a recent innovation.  
While that broad prohibition was first articulated in the church 
property cases of the 1960s and 1970s, its breadth only became 
clear in Employment Division v. Smith. Since Smith, the prohibition 
has been applied in innumerable contexts, with the unexpected 
result that a broad swath of cases are now deemed nonjusticiable 
merely because they would require courts to examine the content 
of religious beliefs and practices.  The rationales articulated for 
this prohibition—the competence of courts to resolve religious 
questions and the separationist principle embodied in the 
Establishment Clause—support only the modest rule adopted in 
Ballard, that courts must not purport to pass judgment on the 
merits of religious beliefs.  These rationales do not support the 
much broader rule, applied since Smith, that courts must not 
attempt to resolve even positive questions about religious practice 
or doctrine.  Such a broad rule is not supported by logic or history 
and, in any event, would be impossible to apply in the absolute 
manner articulated by the cases. 
191 See 492 U.S. at 613-621.
192 See Magarian, supra note 20; Conkle, supra note 119.
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The conclusion that courts are not broadly prohibited from 
resolving positive questions about religious doctrines and practices 
does not mean, however, that courts must necessarily resolve all 
such questions whenever they arise.  Certainly, there are 
circumstances when courts properly refuse to resolve even positive 
religious questions for reasons wholly apart from those used to 
support the broad prohibition discussed in this Article.  For 
instance, a statute or cause of action under which a party raises a 
religious question may not actually require the court to resolve the 
question.  In this regard, courts issued conflicting decisions over 
whether RFRA protects only those religious practices that are both 
central to the plaintiff’s religion and mandated by that religion, 
with some cases holding that the Constitution absolutely prohibits 
them from determining whether religious practices are mandated 
by religion or whether religious beliefs are central to a religion, a 
conclusion that should be rejected for the reasons discussed in this 
Article. 193  It may well be, however, that the text of RFRA does 
not require such inquiry, even if the Constitution and judicial 
competence would allow it.  Indeed, given that religious freedom 
embodied in the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA is understood as 
an individual right, and not in terms of institutional religions, cases 
arising under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA should rarely 
call on courts to decide between conflicting views about religious 
doctrines and practices, as the individual claimant’s understanding 
of his or her religion should control.194
There may also be cases in which the Religion Clauses bar 
courts from taking certain actions based on a resolution of religious 
questions.  Suppose that a rich man donates a large sum of money 
to a Jewish congregation on the stipulation that the congregation 
remain true to Orthodox practices, but the congregation eliminates 
sex-segregated seating and institutes mixed-sex seating.  If the 
donor seeks an injunction against the congregation on the ground 
that mixed seating conflicts with the traditional practices of 
Orthodox Judaism, the logic of this Article suggests that there is no 
bar to a court deciding whether Orthodox Judaism allows men and 
193 See supra note 111.
194 Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 89 at 466.
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women to sit together during religious services.  The conclusion 
that a court is institutionally and constitutionally competent to 
decide that factual question does not, however, mean that no 
constitutional problems would arise if a court were to issue an 
injunction against the practice of mixed-sex seating, as such an 
injunction would almost certainly violate the free exercise rights of 
the congregation and its members.  
A court’s authority to undertake factfinding into positive 
questions about religion is thus a distinct question from its 
authority to impose remedies that may have the effect of inhibiting 
the exercise of religion.  The means by which courts should resolve 
whether a proposed remedy may exceed the court’s constitutional 
authority, however, demonstrates the impossibility of prohibiting 
judicial resolution of religious questions.  In order to determine 
whether the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from 
imposing an injunction against a Jewish congregation from 
instituting same-sex seating, a court would have to determine, 
among other things, whether such seating constitutes the exercise 
of religion, a determination requiring courts to make positive 
assessments about the doctrines and practices of religion.  Thus, 
the resolution of Free Exercise Clause cases, like many others, 
depends on a court’s determination of the content of religious 
beliefs and practices.  Such determinations do not exceed judicial 
competence and cannot plausibly be considered to prohibited by 
the Constitution. 
